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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When people think of NASA, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, they usually think of Space, the "S" in NASA. 
Yet the first "A" in NASA stands for aeronautics. This study concerns 
NASA's efforts to make the aircraft safer for people who fly them 
and fly in them. 
At 9:34 on a January night in 1990, Avianca flight 52 crashed 
at Cove Neck, NY while attempting to land at Kennedy Airport after 
an eight hour flight from Medellin, Colombia. At least 72 of the 161 
people on board were killed (Pusey & Swanson, 1990, p. 3A). This 
was the United State's first air transport accident of 1990. 
Although air travel grew safer during the decade of the 1:980s 
(Ott, 1990), the year saw 1989 with an unusually high number of 31 
fatal commercial passenger airline crashes (Worldwide Fatal 
Accidents, AW&ST, 1990), and the more than 2,000 people who died 
in commercial airplane crashes in 1985 made it the worst year 1on 
I 
I 
record (Chandler, 1986). Probably because of increased awareness of 
these tragedies due to the ease of communications, people want 
something done to improve aeronautics safety. 
1 
i 
Those early adventurers who first fought gravity by flingif g 
themselves skyward in various contraptions generally put no on¢ in 
2 
! 
danger but themselves. But now the skies are crowded with planes of 
i 
all sizes carrying more of us around the globe. The public wants to 
know what is being done to make travel safer and more comfortable. 
What about wind shear and microbursts? Icing? Lightning? Is the 
plane crashworthy and fireworthy? 
A USAir Flight 405 crashed on departure from New York's 
LaGuardia airport in March 1992 because of ice on the wings. The 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) ruled the "probable 
I 
cause of this accident was the failure of the airline industry and 1 the 
Federal Aeronautics Administration" to provide flight crews with 
proper guidelines to deal with icing conditions ( "Fatal Plane Crash," 
1993, p. 7 A). 
Deicing fluid was applied at the gate and again after a delay. 
But during another delay of 35 minutes before takeoff, light snow 
and sleet fell. On the attempted takeoff the plane failed to becoipe 
I 
airborne and crashed into the bay at the end of the runway. Th, 
accident killed 27 of the 51 people on board. (Fatal Plane Crash! 
Blamed on Icy Wings, February 18, 1993, p. 7 A). The article did not 
state whether USAir was using Type I ethylene glycol deicing flµid, 
or the longer lasting Type II deicing fluid. A study by the NASA 
i 
Lewis Research Center in 1989 found that Type II fluids may nbt 
. ! 
need a holdover time limit (Reinmann, 1989). ! 
I 
An ABC World News Report on September 2, 1978 is another 
case in point. Jules Bergman, ABC's science reporter, reported on the 
midair collision between a small four-seat Cessna 172 and a Pacific 
I 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Southwest Airlines Boeing 727 in San Diego, CA. Mr. Bergman q~it 
3 
reporting and, in a sharp commentary, accused the two Cessna pltlots 
I 
of murder and further stated that all little airplanes should be ; 
banned from the skies! Mr. Bergman's solution would hardly have 
solved the problem, but that report was one of many in· which the 
public became aware of the growing problem with aeronautics 
safety. The communications industry has tremendous power to 
inform the public accurately - - or to mislead. 
In fact, the National Transportation Safety Board study showed 
that the airliner overtook and collided with the Cessna, that the · 
Cessna was almost dead center in the airline pilot's and copilot's: 
windscreen for the time from 170 seconds to 10 seconds before· 
collision ("Aircraft Accident Report: Pacific," 1979). Even though Mr. 
Bergman's initial conclusion was incorrect, the public again heard a 
respected voice highlighting problems with aeronautics safety. 
The San Diego collision, the American Airlines DC-10 crash in 
Chicago (Collins, 1986), the Delta Airlines L-1011 crash in Dallas 
(Chandler, 1986) and many other accidents widely reported in fhe 
popular press have led to a heightened public awareness of the~e 
problems and a perceived need for more research in aeronautics 
safety. 
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) sends each 
member an Aviation Fact Card each year, and although aimed ~tits 
I 
membership of mostly general aviation (GA) pilots, its data an1 
comparisons are relevant to this study. Because most aircraft are 
general aviation, one would expect the greatest number of fatalities 
i 
come from general aviation. For 1991, a fairly typical year, gen
1
eral 
I 
4 
aviation had 7 46 fatalities compared with 196 for air carrier ai~craft, 
! 
or roughly four to one GA over air carrier (Aircraft Owners and [Pilots 
Association, 1993 ). Since some air carrier aircraft can carry up to 500 
passengers, one accident can slant the figures for any given year. For 
example, in 1990 there were 736 GA fatalities and only 83 air carrier 
accidents, for a nine to one ratio (Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, 1992 ). Probably a better figure is rate of accidents, and 
the GA fatality rate was 1.35 per 100,000 hours flown to 0.22 for air 
carrier aircraft in 1991 (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 
1993), and 1.39 per 100,000 hours GA fatality rate in 1990 to Q.20 
for air carriers (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 1992). More 
than six times as many people were killed in GA accidents in 1991 as 
in air carrier accidents. Of course, in 1991 there were 41,150 
highway deaths or 94.2 percent of the total transportation deaths 
(Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 1993). 
Obviously, aircraft accidents are not new. The first man to fly 
was Francois Pilatre de Rozier who, along with the Marquis· 
d'Arlandes, made the first manned flight in an aircraft, a Montgolfier 
' hot air balloon on November 21, 1783. On June 15, 1785, de Rozier 
was killed in an attempt to cross the English channel in a composite 
hot air and hydrogen balloon (Taylor & Mondey, 1983). The NASA 
film, Man's Reach, states that in their studies of flight, the Wright 
! 
brothers found that Otto Lilienthal, one of the true aeronautics 1 
pioneers, was killed in what is now called a stall-spin accident. 
Nor is aeronautics research new. Congress created the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) on March 3, 1915, and 
i 
the first government sponsored facility for the study of aeronautics 
I 
5 
was Langley Field, which opened on June 11, 1920 (Anderson, 1~78). 
I 
The NACA role in aeronautics research was not so much for I 
i 
aeronautics safety as it was to make aircraft fly higher, faster, and 
farther. For that matter, the NASA book, .Eifcy Years of Aeronautical 
Research, published in 196 7, devotes only the last seven paragraphs 
to aeronautics safety research. However, the stall/ spin problem has 
been studied from the beginning of the NACA, and aeronautics safety 
has been an unstated goal of many aeronautics research programs. 
Aeronautical safety research has been and is still being studied 
by various governmental agencies, colleges and universities, and 
private and public organizations. The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the Federal Aeronautics Administration 
(FAA), the aeronautics arm of the Department of Transportation 
(DOT), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are the 
principal government agencies concerned with aeronautics safety 
research. The NTSB alone acts only retroactively, getting into the act 
after an accident occurred. 
Some of the universities famous for their aeronautics safety 
research activities are Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Ohio State University, 
Princeton University, Wichita State University, Purdue University, 
and Johns Hopkins University. The Flight Safety Foundation is one of 
the few non-profit independent organizations that 
serves the public interest by actively supporting and participatink in 
the development and implementation of programs, policies and 
procedures affecting safety (Rozelle, 1988, inside front cover). 
6 
NACA became the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration or NASA October 1, 1958 as a result of the National 
Space Act of 1958. This author believes that NASA's role in 
aeronautics safety research has changed direction and increased over 
the years. To examine why this has happened is one of the goals of 
this study. Three NASA centers are concerned principally with 
aeronautics research. They are the NASA Langley Research Center in 
Hampton, Virginia, NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, OH, 
and the NASA Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA. All three of 
these NASA centers conduct some research on aeronautical safety 
related problems. Other NASA centers also conduct research that 
sometimes touches on aeronautics safety. For example, NASA's 
Johnson Space Center conducted research concerning a toxicokinetic 
study of Halon 1301 exposed subjects (New Initiatives Office, 1988). 
Halon is used in fire extinguishers on the Space Shuttle, but it is also 
a fire suppressant used in most other aircraft fire extinguishers. 
The year 1989 was general aviation's safest. "The fatal accident 
rate per 100,000 hours dropped to 1.40 in 1989 from 1.49 in 1988 
and from 1.723 in 1984" ("Last Year." 1990, p. 12). During a March 
1990 discussion in Reno, NV, Russell Watson, the education and 
training director for Cessna Aircraft corporation, concurred with the 
need for a study of NASA aeronautics safety programs for the 
general aviation community. General aviation's safety record, 
improving each year, is so good that according to Mr. Watson, "just a 
few accidents could put a good bump" on the downward trending 
curve. 
7 
To summarize the aeronautics safety "problem," several 
situations, events, and needs are apparent. Some of these are 
incongruous at the very least. Over the past decade the skies have 
become safer, if one accepts the statistics, yet more and more people 
are concerned that the opposite is true. Even though more people are 
concerned about aeronautics safety, more people fly more often. 
In 1978, the major airlines carried 275 million passengers, 
according to the Air Transport Association. By 1988, that 
number had skyrocketed to 455 million (Nather, 1989, p. 28A). 
Consequently, the crowded skies and congested airports create 
more delays and more chances for accidents. Fewer pilots are being 
trained but more pilots are being hired without the same training 
and experience of the past. But experience and better training, 
superior equipment and improved facilities require commitment, 
time, money, and research. One would think the federal government 
would be planning at this moment to alleviate the problems. 
However, this was not the case. The national transportation policy, 
outlined by Transportation Secretary Samuel K. Skinner, called for a 
reduction in federal funding of the aeronautics system (Fotos, 1990). 
All of the above implied a crisis in the skies. 
NASA's aeronautics safety research programs in the years 1980 
through 1989 constitute the scope of this study. The primary sources 
of information will be the annual center research and technology 
reports, NASA technical publications, and NASA special publications 
on research conducted during those years. 
8 
Statement of the problem 
Because of the rising public interest in aeronautics safety, :the 
probable need for further aeronautics safety research, and the lack 
of information on any NASA Aeronautics Safety programs, a 
developmental descriptive study of such programs was deemed 
necessary and timely. Mary Sandy, who was the public affairs officer 
for NASA's Code R, the Directorate of Aeronautics in NASA's Office of 
Aeronautics and Space Technology when this study was started, said 
such a study was needed and would be useful for NASA and others 
concerned with aeronautics safety research. 
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this study was to analyze NASA aeronautics 
safety related research programs for the years 1980 through 1989. 
' 
Objectives 
i 
The objectives of this developmental descriptive study w¢re 
i 
as follows: 
1. To identify NASA aeronautics safety programs for th~ 
years 1980 through 1989; 
i 
I 
I 
2. To classify them as to environment or meteorological [ 
I 
I factors; the machine, the aircraft and related equipmeµt; 
I 
human factors including operations and training; 
3. To trace the development of NASA Aeronautics Safety 
Research Programs by comparing programs for the years 
1980 through 1989; 
4. To summarize each research program; 
5. To determine if NASA aeronautics safety research 
programs have increased in numbers and scope over the 
years 1980 through 1989; and 
6. To compare each program by applicability. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Historical Review of Aeronautics Safety 
Even before true manned flight began, dangers of "the sport" 
were obvious. Many individuals were killed and injured "flying", with 
"wings" usually fashioned from feathers. In 1503, "G. B. Danti 
survived his attempt to fly at Perugia using inadequate wings," ; 
(Taylor & Mondey, 1983). In 1507 John Damian broke a thigh bone 
in an effort from a wall at Stirling Castle in Scotland (Taylor & 
Mondey, 1983). Called tower jumpers, these people measured tI?-eir 
successes only by the falls they survived. Many men and womep. 
died in balloons and parachutes during the late 1700s and 1800s. 
Heavier-than-air powered flight is acknowledged to have • 
begun with a flight of 12 seconds by Orville Wright on the morning 
I 
of December 17, 1903. Lieutenant Thomas Etholen Selfridge of the 
I 
I 
U.S. Army Signal Corps was the first person killed in a powered i 
I 
airplane September 17, 1908. He was a passenger of Orville Wright 
' 
at Fort Myer, VA. Orville Wright was injured (Taylor & Mondey, 
10 
I 
I 
i 
i 
1983). Press coverage brought no public outcry for aeronautics 
safety. 
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 "imposed on the Secretary of 
Commerce and the Department of Commerce the duty of promoting 
and fostering the development of commercial aeronautics in the' 
United States" (Wells, 1989). This Act, among other things, defined 
air commerce and set into effect such things as licenses and 
inspections of aircraft and pilots. 
11 
All students of aeronautics history are aware of the "fact" that 
American pilots in World War 1 were not allowed parachutes 
because Congress thought that pilots would unnecessarily abandon 
expensive airplanes if pilots were issued parachutes. In the 
television series "Wings," on the A&E cable channel, Eddie 
Rickenbacker is quoted as seeing Frank Luke jumping to his death 
from his blazing airplane, even though he had no parachute. There 
was no real interest in aeronautics safety, except among those who 
flew. But then, only daredevils flew. 
No real call for aeronautics safety was made until 1931. ;Xt 
10:47 a.m. March 31, 1931, the famous football coach Knute Ro~kne 
of Notre Dame was killed in the crash of a TWA Fokker F-lOA 
(Maisel, 1991, pp. lB, l0B). The wooden tri-motor transport in which 
he was a passenger "dived out of a leaden sky" (Maisel, Mar. 3li, 
i 
1991, P. lB). The airplane broke up during a thunderstorm and[ 
I 
c;:rashed into a hillside in Baazar, Kansas. The press reports bl~ed 
i 
12 
the breakup on the fact that the airplane was built of wood (Pylf, 
1992). That crash led to the end of the use of wooden aircraft in: 
airline service. It is debatable whether there was a public or a press 
outcry on the need for safety in the skies. 
In 1934 military pilots were used for air mail service after 
President Roosevelt canceled all air mail contracts on February 9, of 
that year. The President and Postmaster General Farley were under 
pressure from people and aeronautics groups who felt that the 
previous Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown had not been fair 
in the handling of air mail contracts. The belief was that there was 
collusion between Brown and the bigger airlines. Taking a drastic 
step, the President canceled all air mail contracts and pressed army 
pilots into flying the mail. The army and its planes and pilots were 
not up to the task. The army pilots flew less than one half of the 
previous route mileage and had to contend with severe winter 
weather. In the first week five pilots died in crashes, and six others 
were injured (Wells, 1989). The army flew the air mail from 
February 19, 1934 to May 31, 1934, and before the death and 
destruction were over and new contracts were awarded, the Army 
Air Corps had lost twelve pilots and had sixty-six forced landings 
(Pyle, 1992). 
The entire fiasco put a damper on commercial aeronautics growth in 
the United States for several years and opened the Roosevelt 
administration to severe public condemnation. Furthermore, it 
clearly showed how budget limitations had seriously affected the 
quality of training which the army could offer its pilots (Holms, 
1981, p. 162). 
13 
The next big push for aeronautics safety came after a midair 
I 
collision between a TWA Super Constellation and a United DC-7 bver 
! 
I 
the Grand Canyon that killed 128 people in 1956. The result was the 
Federal Aeronautics Act of 1958. President Eisenhower cited the 
Grand Canyon midair collision and other midair collisions in asking 
for "a system of traffic management which will prevent, within the 
limits of human ingenuity, a recurrence of such accidents" (WeU:s, 
1989). 
Air tragedies seem to precede legislation or rule changes. : 
Aeronautics safety rule making has always been retroactive - not 
proactive. The midair collision between an Aeronaves De Mexico DC-9 
and a Piper PA-28-181 over Cerritos, CA on August 31, 1987 is one 
of the latest to spur tougher rules ("Aircraft Accident Report," 1987). 
In this accident a private aircraft entered a Terminal Control Area 
(TCA) without permission and collided with an Air Mexico OC-9~ As a 
result of the accident all aircraft operating within thirty nautical 
miles of a TCA must have an operating Mode C encoding altimeter 
I 
t 
that provides air traffic control with altitude as well as position 
information. It is unfortunate that accidents rather than reasoni bring 
about changes in the airspace system. 
The original United States aeronautical testing agency was the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics or NACA, formed: by 
! 
Congress on March 3, 1915 with an initial outlay of $5,000 ( Sruridy & 
i 
Martin, 1990). The first test facility was started in July 1917 a~ 
Langley Field in Virginia. The facility included a wind tunnel similar 
to the one built by Gustave Eiffel with a test section about five feet in 
diameter. The first decade of the NACA and the Langley facilitf, 
14 
1917-1927, saw much outstanding work on calibration and 
instrumentation that made the NACA a world leader in aeronautical 
research (Anderson, 1978). 
The second decade, 1928-1937 at Langley, began on an 
upsurge of interest. Lindbergh had crossed the Atlantic in 1927, and 
the whole world became interested in aeronautics. By 1937 the 
world and aircraft had changed. Now the best airplanes were all 
metal monoplanes, with enclosed cockpits and retracting landing 
gear. And suddenly the world was threatened by the Axis powers 
(Anderson, 1978). 
The years of World War II saw another revolution in aircraft -
from the end of biplanes and fabric covering to the turbine or jet 
powered aircraft. After the war a Bell XS-1, flown by Air Force 
Captain Charles (Chuck) Yeager, first flew faster than the speed of 
sound on October 14, 1947. In 1948, the British first flew the first 
turboprop airliner, and in 1949, the DeHavilland Comet became the 
first turbojet propelled transport (Anderson, 197 8 ). 
The NACA became the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration on October 1, 1958 as the result of the Space Act of 
1958. This change, brought about as a reaction to the Russian 
Sputnik satellite launched in 1957, put the first "A" in NASA 
"aeronautics" out front as the need for research intensified. 
Two other well-known federal agencies involved in aeronautics 
safety research are the Federal Aeronautics Administration, or iFAA, 
I 
' 
and the National Transportation Safety Board, the NTSB. A good 
example of the type of FAA aeronautical safety studies is the 
Colangelo and Russell study on injuries to seat occupants of ligh~ 
I 
airplanes. The authors studied 55 light airplane accidents trying] to 
I 
find the role of the seats in injuries to occupants. The findings ! 
concluded that large accelerations tend to damage seats and cause 
injury (Colangelo & Russell, 1989). 
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The NTSB is best known for accident investigations and reports, 
but the NTSB also produces frequent statistical compilations on 
aeronautics accidents. A 1989 NTSB statistical report studied 361 
general aviation accidents. The probable cause or a related factor 
was that these aircraft used visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) in all the accidents (NTSB,1989). It is 
this researcher's belief that safety research after the fact is very 
important, but for aeronautics safety education, it is like studying 
lawn mower safety by counting missing fingers and toes. 
Although NASA, the FAA, and the NTSB are probably the best 
known national aeronautics safety research organizations, other 
federal agencies and facilities are involved in aeronautics safety 
research. The Sandia National laboratories in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico in 1989 analyzed the packaging and transporting of 
radioactive materials in air transports and the effects in a crash~ 
(McClure & Luna, 1989). 
The Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base in Dayton, OH is also involved in aeronautics safety 
research, as is the Army Aeronautics Systems Command at Fort· 
Eustis, Virginia. The Office of Technology Assessment in Washington, 
DC also studies safety policies, regulations, and technologies of the 
government in terms of insuring safety in commercial aeronauttcs 
i 
(OTA, 1988). And Vladislav Mazur of NOAA's National Severe Storms 
I 
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Laboratory in Norman, OK had an article in the Journal of Geophysical 
Research ( 1989) on "Triggered Lightning Strikes to Aircraft and 
Natural lntercloud Discharges." 
The popular press is always involved after the fact in air 
crashes. Crashes make good copy, and the press always seems to 
have the cause immediately, or within a few days. This is not to say 
that it is all headline grabbing. In 1977 the National Geographic 
magazine had a 2 7-page article titled, "The Air-Safety Challenge" 
(Long, 1977). The Dallas Morning News won a Pulitzer prize for its 
in-depth study of the crash of a business jet on April 4, 1986, in 
Bowie County, TX. "The Final Flight of SO Sierra Kilo" was an excellent 
study in what should not have happened (Hanners, 1988 ). But is 
that not what aeronautics safety is all about? Accidents should not 
happen. 
CHAPTER III 
SUMMARIES OF THE STUDIES DONE 
Along with NASA Headquarters in Washington, DC, nine NASA 
research field centers are located throughout the country. They 
include: 
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California 
Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 
Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Florida 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California 
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama and 
Stennis Space Center, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. 
In order to conduct the study of NASA's aeronautical research 
programs over the past ten years, it was necessary to identify the 
I 
programs conducted at the NASA aeronautics research field centers. 
Langley, Ames, and Lewis are NASA's aeronautical research cen 1ters. 
The other centers may conduct research with applications to 
aeronautics but not specifically related to aeronautics safety. T~us, 
I 
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the Annual Research and Technology Reports for NASA's aeronautics 
centers for the period 1980-1989 were studied to identify programs 
for the survey. Once the aeronautics safety research programs were 
identified, the following procedures were followed: 
1. Identified aeronautics safety research programs from 
NASA Center's Annual Research and Technology Reports. 
2. Classified research programs broadly into three elements 
Human - human factors, operations, and training; 
Machine - structures, instrumentation, stability and 
control; 
Environment - meteorological factors, storm hazards. 
3. Cross referenced programs, as necessary, with other 
events: 
NTSB reports 
FAA studies 
Air tragedies 
Congressional studies 
Popular press outcries (le problem du jour) 
4. Summarized research programs 
5. Tabulated summaries in chronological order 
The Environment 
The environment, through which aircraft fly, can be benign or 
vicious. Almost anyone who has more than a little experience a$ a 
I 
pilot, air crew member, or passenger in aircraft can remember a 
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flight where the weather provided an exciting trip. This writer has a 
vivid memory of a flight from Washington National Airport to 
Roanoke, VA on Christmas Eve in 1959. In those days Piedmont 
Airlines still used the Douglas DC-3, a 25 - year old design. The night 
was snowy, cold, and generally miserable with a low ceiling and poor 
visibility, and the passengers were more than a little apprehensive. 
The unpressurized DC-3 flew below 10, 000 feet, and the turbulence 
was more than enough to keep the air sickness bags working. The 
flight from Washington National Airport to Charlottesville, then on to 
Roanoke along the Blue Ridge Mountain chain in stormy weather, 
usually meant bumpy rides. Passengers were not .encouraged when 
the copilot kept coming into the cabin to check for ice on the wings. 
And there was ice! The passengers could see it, and the writer saw it. 
In the 1980s airliners were pressurized for higher flying, but 
icing and turbulence were still problems. Most weather occurs below 
10, 000 feet, but turbulence called clear air turbulence occurs at the 
altitudes where airliners and business jets fly. Icing is a possibility 
whenever aircraft fly in visible moisture. Icing detection systems as 
well as anti-ice and deicing systems are discussed in the section on 
machines. Clouds and rain are examples of visible moisture. Other 
possible weather hazards include microbursts, a weather 
phenomenon undefined before the 80s, and lightning in and near 
thunderstorms. Heavy rain was a known hazard, but a hazard of 
unknown magnitude. 
Also, a problem caused by aircraft themselves had to do with 
wing tip vortices. They are an effect of lift generation in which a 
horizontal vortex of air streams back from the wing tips. The h~avier 
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the aircraft the stronger the vortices, and a following aircraft fl)fing 
I 
into wing-tip vortices can be uncontrollable, with many fatal crashes 
having occurred from such vortex encounters. NASA's researchers 
studied all these problems during the decade of the 1980s. 
A tragic accident occurred at D/FW airport at Dallas, Texas the 
afternoon of August 2, 1985 when Delta Airlines Flight 191 
encountered a microburst in a thunderstorm penetration on its 
landing approach. The accident killed 137 people (Chandler, 1986, 
front cover flap). This set off many studies as new questions arose: 
• How can microbursts be detected? 
• How should the pilot fly the aircraft if a microburst is 
encountered? 
• Can microburst wind shear be characterized? 
• Can computer codes be produced to simulate 
micro bursts? 
• Was heavy rain a contributing cause? 
Heavy Rain 
NASA began studying the effects of heavy rain on airfoil 
performance in 1982, and in 1985 Langley Research Center 
conducted a wind tunnel study on the effects of heavy rain on a 
small-scale airfoil. Some aircraft crashes with heavy loss of life !may 
I 
have been caused by the weight and airflow obstruction of water on 
the wings of the aircraft. The Pan American Flight 759, which 
crashed in Kenner, LA on July 9, 1982, may have been due to a 
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micro burst with windshear and/ or heavy rain, although at that :time 
I 
the term "microburst'' was not in the lexicon of aeronautics and : 
meteorology at that time. 
NASA Langley conducted wind tunnel tests in the 4 by 7 Meter 
Tunnel using a model wing airfoil section of a Lockheed L-1011 wide 
body aircraft. A water spray manifold was located 25 feet in front of 
the airfoil section, and the water spray simulated a heavy rain 
environment. On a tour of the facility in 1985 we were told the rain 
rates simulated in the experiment were up to 40 inches per hour. 
When questioned about the 40 inch-per-hour rate, Langley 
personnel explained it had been hypothesized that such seemingly 
impossibly high rain rates, were indeed possible. Up to that time rain 
gauges were used for determining only the amount of rain, not the 
rate. We were told that the first time a true rain-rate meter was 
tested in what was called an "ordinary thunderstorm," rates of 40 
inches per hour were recorded over short periods of time. The 
airspeeds for the runs were between 112 and 159 feet per second. 
For maximum rain rates, the tests showed a 20 percent reduction of 
lift. 
The NASA researchers were worried that scaling effects and 
the two-dimensional air /water environment used in the wind tunnel 
tests could be a problem in extrapolating the wind tunnel heavy rain 
effects to the heavy rain effects on full scale airfoils. Langley 
researchers, however, did suggest that full size airplanes wouldj 
I 
I 
experience lift loss at much lower rain rates than those simulated in 
the wind tunnel. 
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In 1988 Langley researchers, using the Aircraft Landing 
Dynamics Facility (ALDF) Rain Simulation System (RSS), tested a 1 full-
scale airplane wing section in simulated heavy rain. The ALDF /RSS is 
500 feet long, 44 feet wide, and has three 10 inch diameter irrigation 
pipes supported 40 feet above the ALDF track. With 1590 nozzles 
expelling 4000 gallons of water in 20 seconds, a rain rate of 40 
inches per hour, ± 10 percent, was achieved over an area 1 S feet 
wide and 500 feet long. Rain rates of 2, 10, 30, and 40 inches per 
hour were possible. Lift and drag tests were made with speeds of 
100 knots to 170 knots and angles of attack from 6° to 20°. 
The wing section was a 10-foot chord NACA 64-210 equipped 
with leading edge slats and double slotted flaps. The angle of attack 
range was 7 .5° to 19.5° with simulated rain rates of 9 to 40 inches 
per hour. At 40 inches per hour, the maximum lift was reduced JS to 
20 percent and the stall angle decreased by about 6°. The LDRF/RSS 
results correlated well with the small scale wind tunnel tests 
showing that the scaling effects were not as large as expected. 
Microbursts/Windshear 
Although rain was present at the time of the Delta Flight 191 
accident at Dallas, rain did not cause the crash (Bach & Wingrove, 
I 
1986, p. 65 ). The Delta crash was caused by wind shear in 
encountering a microburst. Wind shear is any abrupt change in the 
wind direction or speed, either horizontally or vertically. An ai11Plane 
is assumed to be flying in a body of air that is homogeneous. 
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I 
i 
I 
However, that assumption is often not true, and the wind shear /near 
mountains or near thunderstorms can be strong enough to be 
extremely dangerous. After the Delta Dallas crash, nearly everyone 
studied wind shear in a microburst. Newly developed technology 
made it possible to reconstruct the winds encountered by Flight 191. 
With the newer digital flight-data recorders (DFDR), sufficient 
data became available for use in conjunction with Air Traffic Control 
(ATC ) radar data to determine the winds. Using the computer 
program SMoothing for Aircraft Kinematics, or SMACK, developed at 
Ames to support the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 
the microburst/wind shear winds encountered by Delta Flight 191 
were reconstructed (Bach, 1981, p. 31). The SMACK program 
combines and processes data from digital flight recorders and air 
traffic control radar systems to provide an accurate "reconstruction 
of aircraft position, velocity, and attitude during the critical 
moments" of an accident or incident (Bach, 1981, p. 31 ). 
In 1986 Langley researchers conducted a general study on 
microbursts. They recognized the importance of microbursts as ~ 
causal factor in aircraft accidents and the goal of the study was :"to 
define the probability distribution of wind shear severity in 
microbursts in order to predict exceedance probabilities and other 
statistical characteristics" (McKissick, 1986, p. 38 ). Such inform~tion 
would be important in establishing alert/warning criteria for 
airborne systems. ! 
i 
The researchers used data from 219 microbursts and compared 
probability of distributions of wind shear magnitudes by using :the 
i 
three parameter Weilbull distribution. The results indicated th~t the 
! 
Weilbull distribution was a valid statistical tool in defining "the 
probability distribution of wind shear severity in microbursts" 1 
(McKissick, 1986, p. 38). 
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Researchers from Langley's Windshear Research Program used 
the large amount of data and extensive analysis by numerous 
investigators to model a microburst. The collected data· and analysis 
included atmospheric conditions just prior to and during the event. 
Information on rain, hail, and the outflow propagation rate was 
available. The "information was used to initialize the model, whi~h 
then generated the full-scale output of microburst parameters" ; 
(Bowles, 1987, P. 59). The model, when compared with the DFW 
atmospheric information, showed excellent agreement. The DFW 
microburst "propagated from a diameter of zero to approximately 6 
miles over a period of 7 to 8 minutes " (Bowles, 1987, p. 60). 
In 1988 Ames researchers, again using the Delta Flight 191 
data and serving as part of the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) study of the accident, developed a multiple ring vortex model 
that could be used in flight simulators to better understand the · 
control problems in microburst encounters (Schultz & Wingrove, 
1988, pp. 88, 89). 
Langley Research Center also conducted two microburst-wind 
shear studies in 1988. The first was to increase the fidelity of 
analytical models of wind shear for use in training and researc~ 
simulators by investigating and characterizing the aerodynamici 
effect of wind shear. Like the Ames study, this was three-
dimensional to determine the effect of spatial variation of the wind 
field on an airplane's aerodynamic characteristics. The research~rs 
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developed a modified vortex-lattice computer program using a 1 
I 
method of characterizing the aerodynamic effect in the form of wind 
shear aerodynamic coefficients (Vicroy, 1988, p. 69). The results 
indicated that there may be a significant amount of control authority 
required to counteract wind shear forces and moments in a 
microburst environment due to spatial variation in the wind field. 
These forces and moments were not factored into research and 
training in use at that time (Vicroy, 1988, p. 69). 
The second study, a logical follow on, evaluated the "piloting 
factors and performance of a candidate set of wind shear recovery 
techniques in a piloted simulation environment " (Hinton, 1988, p. 
70). This program used three techniques for recovery implemented 
as flight director guidance algorithms in the Visual/Motion Simulator. 
A math model for a Boeing 737-100 was used, and 252 data runs 
were made by three research pilots. Each run had a wind shear 
encounter soon after takeoff. The results showed that maximum 
recovery performance would include reduced pitch to reduce climb 
rate, the use of the smallest acceptable climb angle, and later in the 
encounter, increased pitch to the stick-shaker angle of attack. "$tick-
shaker activation must be delayed as long as possible" (Hinton, 1988, 
p. 70). Flight-path-angle based guidance showed the most promise. 
In 1989 Langley researchers conducted a study to determine if 
a forward-look sensor could be an aid to escape a microburst 
encounter or to recover from a microburst encounter. This research 
I 
! 
studied the possible safety benefits from a sensor that would alert 
the crew to a micro burst ahead of the aircraft and indicate how far 
ahead must the sensor see the microburst. The Visual/Motion 
Simulator, programmed as a Boeing 737, was used. Three escape 
strategies were implemented as flight director guidance. 
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The base-line strategy, used at that time by flight crews, was to 
"rotate to an initial pitch of 15° then control sink rate; to track the 
glide slope to a preset altitude at full thrust to preserve airspeed, 
then to fly level until exiting the shear, and manage the flight path 
angle to avoid obstacles and unnecessary climb" (Hinton, 1989, p. 
83 ). Reactive and forward-look detection and warning were used in 
the simulated encounters. A total of 455 microburst encounters were 
flown using NASA and air carrier pilots. The wind shear models used 
were a numeric model of the Dallas/Fort Worth microburst and an 
advanced analytical model. 
The results indicated, that with reactive warning only, there 
was little if any difference in the three strategies. With forward-look 
warning, the advanced strategies showed improvement over the 
baseline, but minimum altitudes were similar. With a 10 second 
forward-look detection, recovery performance was much improved. 
The greatest improvement in microburst recovery comes when 
recovery is initiated early (Hinton, 1989, p. 83 ). 
Clear Air Turbulence 
In the early 1980s there were several instances where ait 
! 
transport aircraft in cruise would encounter momentary severe: 
turbulence. Severe turbulence is defined as "turbulence that ca1;.1ses 
large, abrupt changes in altitude and/ or attitude. It usually cau~es 
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large variations in indicated airspeed. Aircraft may be moment4rily 
out of control" (AIM 1992, § 7-23). The FAA says Clear Air 
Turbulence can occur at altitudes above 15,000 feet, but Ames 
Research Center studied occurrences at cruise altitudes above 30, 
000 feet. 
A 1982 Ames study analyzed a clear air turbulence incident of 
a DC-10 cruising at 37,000 feet near Hannibal, MO in April 1981. The 
DC-10 apparently encountered a series of discrete horizontal vortices 
that appeared "to be a type of air motion, called 'cat's eye' vortices" 
(Bach, 1982, pp 45, 46 ). These vortices were hypothesized as being 
associated with unstable shear layers in the jet stream probably 
caused by a local storm front. The researchers used the computer 
program SMoothing for AirCraft Kinematics or SMACK developed at 
Ames to support the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to 
simulate the desired winds. The necessary time-history data came 
from the DC-lOs digital-flight data recorder and ATC radar data. 
Ames researchers, in· a continuation of the NASA/NTSB Clear 
Air Turbulence study, concluded in 1983 that severe clear air 
turbulence encounters usually occur at altitudes of 34,000 to 40,000 
feet and are associated with strong wind shears in the jet stream or 
strong mountain waves down wind from the mountain range. Pilots 
trained in mountain flying are aware of the possibilities of severe to 
extreme turbulence in rotors, strong vortex wind whorls, whic~ may 
I 
or may not be marked by clouds. The "severe encounters resul~ from 
I 
! 
a breakdown of wind shear layers into (Kelvin-Helmholtz) vortex 
arrays" (Wingrove, 1983, p. 17). The results of the study suggested 
vortex possibilities to 1,000 feet in diameter, spacing about 3,000 
I 
! 
! 
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feet, and wind whorl speed above 60 feet per second. 
I 
By 1984 the most likely altitudes for encountering clear-~ir-
turbulence, or at least the most recent encounters, were at altitudes 
from 37,000 to 39,000 feet. The analysis indicated "the airplanes 
encountered vortex arrays which were generated by destabilized 
wind shear layers associated with strong temperature near the : 
tropopause" (Wingrove, 1984, p. 30). The vortices were thought ,to be 
caused by lower-level barriers as the previously mentioned 
mountain range, or line of thunder storms. The encounters occur in a 
lee wave about 10 to 14 miles downwind of the barrier. A severe 
turbulence encounter can cause changes of angle of attack ( oc) frbm 
-5° to 10° and force ranges of -1 g to+ 2 Gs. 
In 1986 Ames reported that extreme clear-air-turbulence was 
caused by vortex arrays in the tropopause. Since modem airliners 
and business jets operate at higher altitudes and spend more time in 
the region of the tropopause, they have a greater possibility of 
encountering severe/ extreme turbulence. Some of the cases of • 
dangerous high altitude turbulence studied were Pan Am Boein~ 
747s over Greenland in January, February, and November of 1985, a 
United 747 near Hawaii in March 1986, and a Sabena DC-10 over 
upstate New York in April 1986. By 1986 the NASA team of 
scientists and engineers had "identified the strength, size, and 
spacing parameters of vortex arrays, thereby providing a meanf to 
. i 
study the effects of these severe wind -hazards on operational safety" 
I 
(Wingrove & Bach, 1986, p. 84 ). i 
The Douglas Aircraft Company, under contract to Langley: 
Research Center's Advanced Transport Operating Systems (ATqPS) 
I 
i 
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i 
office, conducted a wind turbulence model study in 1982. The gbal 
I 
was to evaluate state-of-the-art turbulent gust modeling techniques 
for simulating the flight of large transports. Ground-based flight 
simulators are used extensively in pilot training, but NASA uses 
them for research. Ground-based flight simulators have become more 
sophisticated, and for use in handling and ride-quality research, they 
must be ultra realistic. Because flight testing is so expensive, ground-
based simulators are a necessity. In real life, atmospheric turbulence 
affects ride quality, handling, pilot work load, and pilot perform:ance. 
Computer code for six well-known turbulence-generation . 
models was produced along with documentation. Included were 
"example gust time histories, probability distributions, power density 
spectra, and tabulated statistical properties" (Bowles, 1882, pp. 49, 
SO). This allowed for direct comparison with actual atmospheriC 
turbulence and comparisons among· the models. One finding was that 
in some turbulent gust models, turbulent energies were less than 
expected from previous research. In 1985 Langley conducted an in-
house study to model wind gusts statistically. It used an 
' 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA). This method 
was tested on gust components measured during flights of Langley's 
F-106B into thunderstorms during Langley's Storm Hazard Program. 
NASA Storm Hazards (Lightning) Research 
Langley's Storm Hazard Program began in 1980 and studied 
the characteristics. of lightning strikes and their effects on aircraft. 
30 
Lightning strikes are not unknown occurrences for aircraft, but fhey 
seldom cause damage because most aircraft are made of metal. 
However, more aircraft and aircraft parts are being made of 
advanced composite materials, and lightning could become a greater 
problem. In 1843 Michael Faraday in England found that the 
electrical charge on a conductor stays on the outside of the conductor 
(Miller, 1977). Thus if lightning strikes a metal airplane, it could 
attach and move across the aircraft structure, then detach but always 
stay on the outside of the airframe. With nonconducting composite 
structures, the results may not be the same. 
The NASA-owned F-106B was used to fly in the vicinity of and 
to penetrate thunderstorms thus hoping to sustain direct lightning 
strikes. It was configured with numerous sensors mounted on the 
noseboom, fuselage, wing, and empennage to detect electromagnetic 
fields present during the lightning strike process. A shielded 
recording system was located in the missile bay of the former USAF 
fighter. The recording instrumentation included: 
a wideband (6 MHz) video recorder for overall lightning strike: 
phenomenon and a transient waveform recorder modified to capture 
1.3 milliseconds of data at a 10-nanosecond resolution The sensors 
were derived from designs developed for nuclear electromagnetic 
pulse measurements (Dove, 1980, p. 21). 
Fisher and Plumer of General Electric, in their 1977 book, 
Lightning Protection of Aircraft, attempted to 
present under one cover the current state of knowledge 
' 
concerning the potential lightning effects · on aircraft and the/ 
means that are available to designers and operators to protect 
against these effects (Fisher & Plumer, 1977, p. iii). 
I 
! 
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The authors summarized studies by Plumer and Hourihan of GE,, 
Anderson and Kroninger of South Africa, Perry of the British Civil 
Aeronautics Authority, Trunov of the USSR National Research 
Institute for Civil Aeronautics, and an earlier study by Newman and 
Robb. In summary, those studies indicated that an aircraft was most 
likely to be struck by lightning if it was: 
• in the vicinity of a thunderstorm, 
• the air temperature was near 0° Celsius, 
• the aircraft was at altitudes of 5,000 to 15,000 feet, 
• and, it was climbing or descending near an airport (Fisher 
& Plumer, 1977, pp. 57, 58, 70). 
In a briefing for this writer in 1981, Bruce Fisher the project 
engineer, said that the first flight tests were flown in thunderstorms 
at altitudes from 5,000 to 15,000 feet where the temperatures were 
near 0° C, but the aircraft received few lightning strikes. He 
concluded that the reason for the different history of lightning ' 
strikes was that an aircraft flew through those altitudes climbing 
from or descending to airports. At cruise altitudes pilots usually 
avoided thunderstorm cells, changing course to go around themi 
I 
I 
The F-106B took its first lightning strikes during flight te$ts at 
! 
NOAA's National Severe Storms Laboratory at Norman, Oklahoma. 
I 
The NOAA laboratory supplied measurements from its ground ~ased 
Doppler radar. The lightning flights were flown by research pilots 
Perry Deal of NASA and Maj. Jerry Keyser, an Air Force pilot onj 
I 
! 
I 
I 
32 
i 
I 
temporary assignment to NASA. The first "hit," as Major Keyser( 
1 
described it, was like looking at a six to eight inch diameter headless 
snake which came from right to left, struck the noseboom and 
"spiraled down the left side of the fuselage and was gone" 
(Aeronautics Travel Times. 1981, p 47) .. The second occurred that 
; 
afternoon when Perry Deal was the pilot. Hitting the noseboom, the 
strike "split into streamers down both sides of the aircraft," (Weather 
Advisory, 1981 p. 47) one attaching to the top of the left wing and 
the other attaching below the right wing. On inspection after the 
flight, it was found that the second strike attach points traveled 
down the middle of the F-106B's delta wing. The attach points near 
, the middle of the wing came as a surprise to the researchers. They 
did not think of the middle of the wing as an attach point zone. A 
possible problem was the wing skin is not as thick in that area, and 
that is where fuel tanks are located. 
The attach points were likened to rough but shiny spots that 
looked as if they were made by "the twist of a knife point"(Weather 
Advisory, 1981, p 47). Mr. Fisher said at the attach points the 
aluminum skin was melted and quickly re-solidified. He also said the 
lightning attach points were pit marks about the size of the heap of a 
pin. Mr. Fisher said the new low power avionics and increased use of 
advanced composites made the lightning tests necessary. Lightriing 
I 
strikes on aircraft have not been a major safety problem, but iri the 
years from 1964 to 1971, two accidents were recorded with no i 
i 
fatalities (Aeronautics Travel Times, 1981, p 49 ). 
Nine strikes were sustained in Oklahoma. The initial three 
strikes showed a more active electric field compared to the magnetic 
I 
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field expected by the researchers (Fisher, 1980, p. 21 ). During t~e 
' 
same thunderstorm season, eleven flights were made in Virginici 
using ground based storm measurements from NASA Wallops Flight 
Center. In all there were 68 storm penetrations with only 10 direct 
hits. 
For all lightning strikes, measurements were taken of 
lightning's: 
• electromagnetic properties 
• X-ray emissions 
• nitrous oxide concentrations 
• optical properties 
• and turbulence environment. 
The NASA Storm Hazards Program ended in 1986. In the seven 
years of operation, the NASA F-106B withstood 714 direct lightning 
strikes, with twenty four coming in 1986. During the test period, 
higher strike rates came at colder temperatures aloft. Only 98 strikes 
came at altitudes below 20,000 feet, where most commercial and 
military strikes had been reported. Most of these may have been 
cloud to ground strikes. Mr. Fisher said the principle reason for ;the 
history of low-altitude strikes was that aircraft flew through those 
altitudes on climb-out and descent, but avoided thunderstorm cells 
at cruise altitudes. At higher altitudes most strikes were trigger;ed by 
the presence of the aircraft. 
The electromagnetic measurements have provided data tq 
establish a statistical basis for peak rate changes in the current 
change and electric flux density between the altitudes of 15,000 feet 
and 40,000 feet. "The peak of rate current change was found to be 
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several times larger than previous design criteria" (Fisher, 1986f pp. 
! 
89, 90). The onboard camera data showed that the entire exterior 
surface of the F-106B may be susceptible to direct lightning 
attachment. Lightning attachment zone concepts will need to be 
changed for future designs (Fisher, 1986, p. 90). This would alter the 
lightning protection design considerations for future aircraft (Fisher 
& Pitts, 1987, p. 22). 
The six years of flight tests of the full scale F-106B through 
thunderstorms suggested some possible lightning leader attachment 
points that were not expected. This was suspected from flight tests 
but not previously confirmed. Lightning Technologies Incorporated, 
under contract to NASA, used test techniques established by the 
Society of Automotive Engineers Lightning Technologies to check for 
these possibilities. A ten percent scale F-106B was mounted on a 
dielectric stand that allowed three degrees of attitude adjustment. 
The model was coated with conductive paint and was positioned 
approximately midway between a rod electrode suspended above 
the model and a ground plane beneath the model 
(Fisher & Pitts, 1988, p. 21 ). 
A rod tip electrode represented the tip of a lightning leader 
and the ground plane represented the diffuse region of opposite 
polarity charge. Simulated lightning leaders were attached at many 
nonextremities, such as wing leading edges, engine inlets, fuselage 
top and even the canopy. The implications arising from these u~sts is 
' 
I 
that new delta or highly swept wing airplanes will need lightning 
protection over the complete exterior. This would be especially 
significant for composite designs (Fisher & Pitts, 1987, p. 21). i 
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Sacrificial Lightning Rods 
One spinoff from the Severe Storm Hazard program was the 
development of sacrificial lightning rods to protect aircraft from 
static discharges and lightning strikes. If one walks along most any 
flight line, a variety of static discharge devices would be seen 
protruding from the trailing edges of wings and flight controls. With 
the proliferation of insulating composites, the Faraday shield of an all 
metal structure is lost. Low power requirements of modern computer 
controlled systems, controls, and avionics made protection from 
electrical spikes necessary. Lightning ·strikes can be damaging or 
destructive to composite structures. The damage can be holes caused 
by bum-through or delamination of layered composites. 
The. NASA Langley-developed lightweight graphite composite 
sacrificial tip "can reduce lightning-strike damage to composite parts 
of aircraft and to dissipate the harmful e_lectrical energy" (Bryan, 
1986, p. 97). The tip is made from highly conductive unidirectional 
graphite fibers in an epoxy matrix. The rods are 0.8 centimeters in 
diameter and 14 centimeters long. They are tapered from 
approximately the last 2.5 centimeters to about half the major 
diameter at the tip. Mounting is on the trailing edges of wings, 
' 
' 
control surfaces, empennage, winglets, and the most aft parts of the 
fuselage. The device was successfully tested on the NASA-own~d 
F-106B Aircraft. 
I 
I 
The invention is owned by NASA, and information on license 
I 
for commercial development may be obtained from NASA's patent 
counsel at NASA Johnson Space Center. 
Wake Vortices 
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Everything that develops dynamic lift by means of lifting 
surfaces, such as wings, or rotors blades, trail behind them a 
horizontal wake in the form of a vortex. Everything - - from a 
butterfly, to the president's helicopter, to the Space Shuttle flying 
down to a landing - - develops wing tip vortices. The strength of the 
vortex is a function of the lift generated. Behind heavy wide-body 
aircraft the wing-tip vortices are horizontal tornadoes. This form of 
turbulence initially was called prop wash, and when props gav~ way 
to jets, the phenomenon not only was still there, but this type of 
turbulence became stronger and more dangerous as the aircraft 
increased in size and weight. NASA, in cooperation with the FM, has 
, . 
studied wake turbulence for years. Studies have shown that peak 
vortex tangent speeds of nearly 300 feet per second have been : 
recorded (TAB/ AERO Staff, 1992, p. 191). Pilots are taught that the 
wing tip vortices trail behind the aircraft and drop about 500 ttj a 
1,000 feet below it. Near the ground the vortices tend to move : 
laterally at a speed of two to three knots. The vortices dissipatei 
I 
I 
down wind of the aircraft. It was usual for air traffic control to keep 
I 
a flight separation of about three to five minutes behind heavy; 
(greater than 300,000 pounds) aircraft. 
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The Airman's Information Manual (AIM) says that "the 
I 
probability of induced roll increases when the encountering air<raft's 
heading is generally aligned with the flight path of the generating 
aircraft" (TAB/ AERO Staff, 1992 7-45, p. 192). This writer once flew 
' 
into a ''wingtip vortex" on a stupid impulse to experience the effect. 
After the four-place Cessna 172 rolled uncontrollably left 90 degrees 
and then back level with no control input, my curiosity level dropped 
to zero. Needless to say, pilots are also taught to stay away from wing 
tip vortices. 
Previous flight tests by NASA and FAA flight tests showed that 
wing tip vortices could be broken up and totally alleviated at a three 
nautical mile separation distance by oscillating the ailerons. In this 
study NASA conducted tests using a scale model Boeing 7 4 7 in the 
Langley Vortex Research Facility that demonstrated the effectiveness 
of lateral-control oscillations on wake vortex alleviation. The tests 
demonstrated that lateral-control, aileron, oscillations with flight 
spoilers upraised reduced rotary motion significantly after a two 
mile separation. During the tests both ailerons and spoilers were 
oscillated asymmetrically through their full range corresponding to 
about a 1/ 4 cycle per second frequency. Periodically changing the 
spanwise distribution and inducing spoiler turbulence produced: an 
extremely complex wake. Visual data analysis provided insight into 
the flow dynamics that contributed to the rapid decay of the w~ke. 
i 
FAA Air Traffic Control terminal instrument flight rules (IFR) 
[ 
require a separation from heavy transports of four to six nautical 
miles. Wing tip vortex alleviation at two or three miles could reduce 
separation and thus reduce delay time significantly. 
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The Machine 
NASA conducted many studies in the 80s that were aimed at 
making the aircraft safer for the flight crews and their passengers. 
Some studies were to help make aircraft safer in weather such as low 
visibility or icing conditions, both in the air and before takeoff. Other 
research was to help make the aircraft easier and thus safer to fly. 
NASA conducted research on new control systems and new 
instrumentation in the 80s. Research on damage detection and 
damage resistant systems was also conducted. NASA also tested 
antimisting fuel additives, crashworthy and fireworthy structures, 
and an explosive emergency egress system. 
king Safety Research 
Icing Detection Systems. Since flight became a mode of · 
transportation considered to be dependable, the hazards of airframe 
icing have held great importance to those who fly. The formation of 
ice on aircraft surfaces is a serious problem causing numerous 
accidents each year. Aircraft icing can exist whenever there is visible 
moisture and the air temperature is at or below freezing. Thus in the 
colder months, it would be rare to fly and not encounter clouds : 
capable of producing ice. For general aviation aircraft, the rule of 
thumb has always been to avoid icing conditions, and if ice begins to 
accrete, flee (Home, 1993, p. T-11). However, by the time ice is 
detected, in the old traditional manner of looking out the windoi, 
I 
I 
the situation may already be dangerous. ! 
t 
For an icing detector to be useful to a pilot and for useful 
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research, it should do more than indicate the presence of ice on an 
aircraft. The instrument should measure icing intensity in terms of 
rate and amount of ice accretion and indicate the liquid water 
content of clouds. NASA and private industry have been studying the 
problem and developing ice detection systems for decades. The most 
successful commercial ice detector is manufactured by Rosemont in 
Burnsville, MN. The system uses a small vibrating probe located 
under the nose of the aircraft. Ice accretions of as little as 0.02 inches 
can be detected (Home, 1993, p. T-11 ). BFGoodrich Aerospace's Jet 
Electronics and Technology subsidiary developed and flight tested 
The SWPlus stall warning and contamination system. It uses sensors 
on the wings and horizontal stabilizer to detect ice and identifies 
performance degradation on takeoff and approach (McKenna, 1993, 
p. 40). 
The Federal Aeronautics Administration (FAA) proposed in the 
early 1980s that Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) certified helicopters 
be required to have ice warning devices. Information from PIPEPS, 
pilot reports, on icing conditions could be supplemented by usirig 
Mode S transponder automated down-link of icing data from 
commuter and air taxi aircraft. Such information is necessary fdr 
general aviation safety. 
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NACA Ice Warning and Rate of Icing 
Meter Update. In 1981 Lewis Research Center researche1rs 
i 
updated the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) ice 
warning and rate-of-icing instrument. The new instrument is lighter, 
simpler, and reduces workload of the pilot. Lewis developed a 
simplified ice detector and accretion meter using a microprocessor 
that calculates and digitally displays a readout on ice accretion rate, 
the total accumulated ice, and the cloud liquid-water content. The 
instrument has a high degree of reliability and can be easily self 
tested in flight. The system's icing detector and accretion meter used 
a pitot-static system and an ice collecting element. that contains• small 
holes. When icing occurs, the small holes are plugged by the ice, thus 
changing the impact pressure in the pitot-static system. The time 
rate change in the pitot-static pressure is used to measure the rate of 
ice accretion. The NASA - developed meter is low cost, light weight 
and inherently reliable (Perkins, 1981, p. 16). 
Microwave Ice Accretion Meter (MIAM). The Microwave Ice 
Accretion Meter (MIAM) developed at Lewis was selected in 1982 
for the Industrial Magazine's IR-100 award. The MIAM measures the 
thickness of ice actually forming on an aircraft surface where most 
ice accretion meters use probes projecting from the surface, and 
surface ice must be inferred. "The MIAM detects the onset of ic1ng, 
continuously monitors ice thickness, and displays ice thickness and 
accretion rate" (Ide, 1982, p. 2). The system uses a microwave 
surface wave guide mounted flush with the surface that changes 
41 
resonant frequency with ice accretion. The frequency shift is 
measured by using a microprocessor that converts a DC voltage • 
proportional to ice thickness. The microprocessor also computes the 
time rate change in thickness to obtain accretion rate. The system 
works on aircraft components either on the ground or airborne and 
mounts on helicopter blades. 
The MIAM, in a strange change of name for an ice detection 
instrument, is now called MIAMI for Microwave Ice Accretion 
Measurement Instrument. Ideal Research and Development Corp. 
flight tested the prototype system on a Cessna 303 in 1985. Ideal 
now plans to adapt the MIAMI system for use in "detecting ice, snow, 
frost and slush on wing surfaces on the ground and to monitor 
deicing fluids" (Hughes, 1993, p. 41). 
Ultrasonic Icing Detector. In 1985 Langley researchers 
studied the feasibility of using pulsed-echo ultrasonic sound to detect 
ice on an airfoil. Initially, the tests were conducted using refrigerated 
ice on an aluminum surface. The test frequency was 5 MHz, and both 
compression and shear waves were studied. The ultrasonic waves 
reflection was detected at the aluminum and ice interface and at the 
ice and air interface. The ice thicknesses tested were four to six 
millimeters. The speeds of sound for the compression and shear 
waves were calculated. It was concluded that an ultrasonic ice 
detection system was feasible, and using electronic signal processing, 
the growth rate of ice buildup could be determined (Smith, pp. 20, 
21). 
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i 
I 
Ground Deicing Fluids. In 1989 NASA's Lewis Research qenter 
i 
and Boeing conducted a joint test program using the Icing Research 
Tunnel (IRT) to evaluate types I and II deicing fluids used by the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA). Several other experimental 
fluids were tested as possible replacements for the Type II deicing 
fluids used at that time. 
Deicing fluids are used to prevent snow or freezing rain from 
sticking to wings and other aircraft surfaces which can cause 
catastrophic losses in aerodynamic performance at takeoff. Several 
air tragedies occurred due to ice build up in the past few years .. The 
Association of European Airlines had found that type II deicing fluids 
lasted longer than type I fluids. The object of the Lewis/Boeing tests 
was to see if the type II deicing fluids degraded aircraft performance 
when the aircraft takes off with deicing fluids on its wings. AEA type 
I fluids are propylene glycol similar to ethylene glycol used by the 
United States airlines for snow and ice removal prior to takeoff. "AEA 
type II fluids are non-Newtonian (Thixothropic) fluids whose 
viscosity varies inversely with the shear applied to the fluid" 
(Reinmann, 1989, p. 121 ). They are gels when at rest, but become 
more liquid, i.e., less viscous, when the air moves across the wiIJ.g. 
Thus these thixothropic fluids flow off the wing at takeoff. 
There were two models used during the testing program. ;Toe 
first was a 0.091 - scale three-dimensional half model of a Boe~ng 
' 
737 - 200, and the other was a 0.18 - scale two dimensional airfoil 
section at the 65 percent span, also a Boeing 737 - 200. 
Wind Tunnel test objectives were as follows: (1) correlate wind tunnel 
! 
and flight test measurements of the aerodynamic effects of deicin~ 
I 
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fluids; (2) evaluate fluid effects at higher angles of attack than co4ld be 
. I 
safely in flight; (3) expand flight test results for parametric variations 
of temperature, airfoil configuration, and fluid formulation; 
(4) contribute to the data base for establishing aerodynamic acceptance 
standards for ground deicing fluids; and (5) obtain data that contribute 
to a physical understanding of the lift loss mechanism. Current type I 
and type II fluids and eight new type II fluids were tested (Reinmann, 
1989, p. 121). 
The IRT tests obtained data on lift, drag, and pitching moment 
through stall; surface static pressures; initial film depth; fluid film 
depth during takeoff; video recordings of fluid flow off; and 
boundary layer velocity profiles. 
It was found that one of the new type II fluids was much 
better than the original type II fluids and did not degrade takeoff 
performance any more than type I fluids. The AEA airlines adopted 
the new type II fluids, and one U. S. air carrier had adopted the new 
deicing fluid at the time of publication of the 1989 Annual Report . 
! 
Some other major U. S. airlines were testing the new type II fluids 
for possible use the following winter. In 1992 only Northwest 
Airlines and United Parcel Service were using Type II fluids, and 
they only started in 1992, three years after the NASA study oq type 
I 
II fluids. There have been eight takeoff accidents due to ice and 
! 
snow contamination since 1882 (McKenna, 1993, pp. 38, 39). i 
i 
The NTSB ruled that the USAIR Flight 405 plane crash at : 
La.Guardia Airport in New York on March 22,1992 was caused by ice 
on the Fokker F-28's wings at the time of takeoff. The NTSB rul~d on 
1 
I 
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February 17, 1993 that the "probable cause of this accident was the 
failure of the airline industry and the Federal Aeronautics 
Administration" to provide flight crews with proper guidelines to 
deal with icing conditions ("Fatal plane crash," 1993, p. 7 A). 
After deicing fluid was applied at the gate, the plane was 
deiced again after a delay, but there was another delay of 35 
minutes before takeoff. During this time, light snow and sleet fell. On 
the attempted takeoff, the plane failed to become airborne and 
crashed into the bay at the end of the runway. Twenty seven of the 
fifty one people on board died in the accident ("Fatal plane crash," 
1993, p. 7 A). 
The debate over the relative efficiencies of Type I and Type II 
deicing fluids continues. The AEA De/ Anti-icing task force say that 
Type II fluids are more efficient because they adhere longer to the 
surfaces, and hold over time is not an issue. The FAA, on the other 
hand, insists on a 20 to 45 minute time limit for Type II deicing 
fluids (Sparaco, 1993, p 34, 35). 
Research also continues. Some issues remaining are whether 
Type II fluids cause runway friction degradation and whether high 
wind velocity and jet blast accelerate the degradation of Type II 
fluids. Another problem is defining weather conditions. "Extreme 
weather" could degrade all deicing fluids faster. Icing sensors could 
be a partial answer to the problem (Sparaco, 1993, p. 35). 
Icing Effects on Stability and Control . When ice accretes on 
an aircraft, the performance is degraded sometimes to the point 
where the aircraft crashes. Three things happen: lift is decreased, 
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drag increases, and the aircraft weight increases. Current icing I 
I 
I 
protection systems decrease aircraft efficiency to some degree, and 
future high efficiency aircraft may require that icing protection be 
provided for only the most critical components. 
It was necessary to develop analytical and experimental 
methods for predicting changes in aircraft handling and performance 
for: 
• enhanced design of aircraft, 
• relaxed-stability advanced control systems, 
• simulator software, 
• analysis of failure modes, 
• certification criteria, 
• and improved operational safety. 
Normally, performance degradation was determined using 
flight testing or icing tunnel testing. Both methods are time 
consuming and expensive. Computational Fluid Dynamics ( CFD) 
analytical prediction could lead to increasingly efficient and cheaper 
alternatives to the icing tunnel and artificial/ natural icing tests. 
Emphasis is currently being placed on the prediction of airfoil 
performance degradation due to leading-edge ice accretions by using 
both thin-layer Navier-Stokes and interactive boundary-layer codes 
(Shaw, 1985, p. 7). 
The computational and experimental programs compared 
' 
results of thin-layer Navier-Stokes predictions and measuremetjits of 
' 
artificial leading-edge ice accretion on a NACA 0012 airfoil. With the 
assumption of turbulent boundary layer growth downstream from 
the stagnation point, prediction and experimental data agreed i 
closely. "However, predicted and measured velocities at two points 
! 
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within the separation-reattachment zone downstream of the ice 
1 
accretion differed" (Shaw, 1985, p. 7). It was theorized that the · 
differences were caused by either ice shape definition, grid 
characteristics, or turbulence modeling. All three possible areas that 
may have caused the differences were investigated. Later use of 
interactive boundary-layer approach cut execution times by an .order 
of magnitude. 
To provide a validating data base, an experimental program 
was conducted to map in detail flow field on airfoils with leading-
edge ice accretions. "Little or no quantitative data existed that would 
be useful for such engineering analyses" (Shaw, 1986, p. 15). 
Lewis conducted two flight research test programs using the NASA 
Lewis DeHavilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter. Clear air flight tests 
with artificial ice shapes on the horizontal stabilizer measured static 
stability changes. As might be expected, the longitudinal control 
forces were weakened, and the static longitudinal stability was 
reduced. Dynamic flight maneuvers were made in natural icing 
conditions with data obtained by using a Kohlman data acquisition 
system. Noted was an 8 - 9 percent degradation, in cruise, due to 
icing in the "primary elevator control power derivatives" (Shaw, 
1986, p. 15). Thus the longitudinal stability was reduced. There was 
greater degradation in the takeoff and landing approach 
configuration. 
Further analysis was planned to help determine the limitations 
of methods used to identify the icing-caused parameters that 
degrade flying qualities. 
In 1988 Langley Research Center also attempted to quantify 
! 
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the effect of ice on aircraft stability and control by comparing fl~ght 
test results with analytical predictions and wind tunnel data. This 
research was in support of the National Aircraft Icing Technology 
Plan and consisted of two parts. The first "was to determine the 
accuracy with which the aircraft stability and control derivatives 
could be estimated" (Batterson, 1988, p. 62). The second "was to 
determine longitudinal stability and control derivatives for the 
aircraft both in clean and 'artificially' iced conditions" (Batterson, 
1988, p. 62). 
To form a basis for stability and control derivatives, 45 
maneuvers were flown at the same flight conditions. The artificial ice 
was "a strip of plastic molded into a generic ice shape seen in flights 
and in the Lewis Research Center Icing Research Tunnel" (Batterson, 
1988, p. 62). Over 200 maneuvers were flown by NASA's 
deHavilland DHC-6 Twin Otter during four flights in December 1987. 
"Flight data were analyzed using the modified stepwise regression 
algorithm developed at Langley Research Center and previously 
reported in NASA TP-1916" (Batterson, 1988, p. 62). 
The results show significant differences between the 
derivatives for the iced and uniced machines. It was concluded that 
the effect of ice accumulation is quantifiable and can be applied in 
the preliminary design phase of aircraft. 
Icing Computational Fluid Dynamics (CED). During the 80s a 
major part of almost any research program was the development of 
analytical methods for designing and predicting the performance of 
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I 
ice prediction systems. Increasingly, computers were put to use :in an 
analytical role, and more powerful computers became available.: The 
icing researchers were now developing algorithms, computer codes, 
and analytical models that would predict where and how much ice 
would form on an aircraft and how ice would affect aircraft 
aerodynamics(Reinmann, 1990). Through the 1980s, computer code 
and analytical model development made possible: 
• ice protection system design/ analysis, 
• droplet trajectory prediction, 
• ice accretion prediction, 
• prediction of aerodynamic changes due to ice, 
• fundamental experiments on physics of ice, 
• and experiments to determine if codes accurately predict 
experimental results. 
Using a Cray 2 supercomputer at the Numeric Aerodynamic 
Simulator (NAS) located at Ames Research Center, icing researchers 
completed the "first Navier-Stokes computations showing 3D nature 
of iced-wing flow field" (Reinmann, 1990). The significance of that 
milestone was the potential for predicting aero-performance loses 
caused by ice on modem wings. This was a necessary step in the 
direction of "predicting response of complete aircraft to icing 
encounters" (Reinmann, 1990). 
Deicing systems 
Mention ice to an old high time pilot, and he will probably offer 
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several stories of "almost" crashes, or even some survival tales. lee 
on flying surfaces increases drag, and adds weight, while decrea)sing 
lift. All aircraft that fly in cold weather must have protection or 
should stay out of icing conditions. Advanced aircraft of the future 
will need anti-icing or deicing systems that are low power, 
lightweight, and reliable. The 1980s research in icing took many 
forms, from icing detection, to ground deicing, anti-ice systems to 
deicing systems. Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, OH, the NASA 
center with the longest history in icing research, has the oldest and 
largest refrigerated icing wind tunnel in the world. 
Lewis Icing Research Tunnel (IRT). The Icing Research 
Tunnel (IRT) started operations in 1944, with the first test run on 
June 9, that year. The unique heat exchanger built for the Altitude 
Wind Tunnel (AWT) and the IRT addition was designed by Mr. 
Carrier of the Carrier Corporation and has never failed in test 
operations (Reinmann, 1990). It is still the largest direct-expansion 
unit in the world with a 21,000 ton capacity at 40° F (ASME, 1987). 
Lewis Research Center also has a deHavilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 
research aircraft for flight through natural icing clouds or man-made 
icing clouds. 
To resolve questions concerning validity of data in the Lewis 
Icing Research Tunnel, Lewis researchers in 1988 ran validation tests 
because the free-stream turbulence levels are different in flight and 
in wind tunnels. Turbulence intensity for smooth air flight conditions 
was less than 0.1 percent. It was found to be 0.5 percent in the. IRT 
I 
so 
even with the cloud-making sprays turned off (Vanfossen, 1988/, p. 
I 
69). 
A NACA-0012 airfoil with a 533 cm (21 inch) chord was used 
for the IRT and flight tests. The flight airfoil was mounted on Lewis' 
DHC-6 Twin Otter. The rough airfoil was made by attaching 2 mm 
hemispheres to the airfoil using four patterns. Different airspeeds 
and angles of attack up to 6° were used. The results were presented 
as Frossling numbers that are dimensionless heat transfer 
coefficients divided by the Reynolds number. Flight and wind tunnel 
data at Reynolds number 1.2 million demonstrated no measurable 
difference between flight and wind tunnel data when no icing doud 
was present. At a Reynolds number of 2.4 million and with the spray 
nozzle atomizing air on, there still was no measurable difference in 
flight and IRT data (Vanfossen, 1988, p. 70). The data obtained were 
incorporated in the NASA Lewis LEWICE ice growth ice prediction 
code. 
At a briefing for NASA Aerospace Education Specialists on 
September 7, 1990, John J. Reinmann stated the NASA aircraft icing 
technology research purpose: to "improve aircraft safety through 
development of advanced ice protection concepts and 
development/validation of advanced icing simulation methodologies." 
The total NASA icing program encompasses: 
• ice protection systems, 
• computer modeling, 
• helicopter test techniques, 
• icing tunnel tests, 
• icing physics, 
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• and flight research. 
General Aviation Deice Systems. In 1980 Lewis Research 
' 
Center conducted a program to develop and evaluate deicing systems 
for general aviation (GA) aircraft. GA aircraft include those that are 
usually not pressurized, and as a result, do not fly above the 
weather. In icing conditions they either do not fly or have some· sort 
of anti-icing or deicing system or systems. Ice protection in the form 
of deicing for GA aircraft has meant pneumatic boots on wing leading 
edges and the leading edges of empennage and propeller surfaces. 
Some modem GA airfoils, such as the Whitcomb designed GAW-1 
airfoil, have larger leading-edge radii, and the effectiveness of 
pneumatic boots on these airfoils is unknown. 
Other ice protection concepts that may be suitable for present 
or future GA aircraft were in the development stage in 1980. One, 
"oozing antifreeze," had been used on large aircraft for many years. 
Another proposed ice protection system was ice phobics, or materials 
on which ice does not tend to accrete or even adhere (Reinmanq., 
1980, p. 5). 
The test systems were installed on the leading edge of a NACA 
64-215 airfoil modified with an enlarged leading edge radius shnilar 
to the Whitcomb airfoils. The tests were made in the Lewis Icing 
I 
' 
Research Tunnel. The oozing liquid antifreeze ice protection sys~em 
' 
was especially effective. The Goodrich Company, TKS, Ltd. in thJ 
United Kingdom, and the University of Kansas Department of 
Aerospace provided support for this research. 
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Electrothermal Deicers . In 1983 the University of Toledo, 
; 
under contract to Lewis Research Center, developed a computer: 
analysis code to predict the performance of electrothermal deicers as 
a part of NASA's rotorcraft and aircraft safety programs. 
Electrothermal deicers would be useful on laminar flow surfaces 
because they would not affect the surface shape or smoothness.· 
Periodically, electrothermal deicing systems heat certain aircraft 
surfaces, such as the leading edges of the wing and horizontal 
stabilizer, to remove any accreted ice. As a rule, energy requirements 
for deicing systems are significantly less than for anti-ice systems. At 
the time of this study helicopter rotor blade deicing systems were 
being developed by many helicopter manufacturers (Lewis, 1983, 
p.18). 
Pneumatic Deicer for Helicopters. The year 1984 saw a 
research program to develop a prototype pneumatic deicer for 
helicopter rotor blades. Support for this research program was 
provided by the B.F. Goodrich Company (BFG) and the U.S. Army. 
Helicopters, by the very nature of their flight envelopes, fly below 
10,000 feet where bad weather and icing conditions often exist in the 
cold seasons of the year. Until this program, electrothermal deicers 
. were the only types in use on helicopters. The large power 
consumption and cost of electrothermal deicers led to the need for an 
alternative. The light weight pneumatic deicers in use on many 
airplanes offered a simpler alternative using less energy. 
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i 
I 
I 
BFG, a manufacturer of deicing boots for airplanes, and NASA 
i 
Lewis Research Center conducted a development and test progr~m 
i 
from 1981 to 1984 using the Lewis Icing Research Tunnel, and the 
U.S. Army assisted by conducting feasibility flight tests using a UH-
1 
lH Huey helicopter. The flight test evaluation included structural 
load surveys, tests of performance and handling, and rain erosion 
tests. Actual icing tests were made by flying behind a helicopter icing 
spray system, and limited flight tests were made in natural icing 
conditions. Artificial icing tests were also flown using the hover. 
spray facility in Ottawa, Canada. During the test period the prototype 
system was modified and improved. 
Pneumatic deicer boots do change the leading-edge shape· of 
the rotor blade. The aerodynamic penalties of these changes can lead 
to degraded performance and possible changes in handling quality. 
The prototype deicing boot demonstrated acceptable performance 
and handling penalties. As on airplanes, "pneumatic deicers for 
helicopter rotors offer an attractive, low cost, mechanically simple 
alternative to electrothermal deicers" (Lewis 1984, p. 12). How'rver, 
the development of an Electro-expulsive deicer at Ames Research 
Center eclipsed the pneumatic deicer system. 
Electromagnetic-Impulse Deicing System (EIDI). Anoth~r 
I 
deicing system developed at Lewis and reported in 1984 was a,i 
I 
Electromagnetic-Impulse Deicing System (EIDI) for use on general 
aviation, transport aircraft, and possibly helicopters. The NASA Lewis 
sponsored EIDI system program was managed by Wichita Stat~ 
University, in cooperation ,with the following industry consortiu:tn 
I 
members: 
Beech Aircraft Company, 
Cessna-Pawnee Division, 
Gates Learjet Corporation, 
Cessna-Wallace Division, 
LearFan Ltd., 
Boeing Commercial Aircraft Company, 
McDonnell Douglas Company, 
Simmonds-Precision, 
and Rohr Industries. 
The array of interested aeronautics industry companies 
indicated the magnitude of the icing problem. 
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The electromagnetic-impulse deicing system was developed as 
an alternative to pneumatic and electrothermal deicing systems then 
in use. Electrothermal deicing systems have high power 
requirements, and the simpler pneumatic deicing systems cannot be 
I 
used with any laminar flow wing airfoils because the airfoil shape 
must remain constant. 
The electromagnetic-impulse deicing system (EIDI) was 
developed, tested, refined, and proved during 1983 and 1984. The 
flight tests were conducted using the NASA Lewis DC-6 Twin Otter 
fitted with a glove on a three-inch extension on the leading edge. The 
glove contained four EIDI coils. The system had potential uses dn a 
wide range of aircraft including general aviation, commuter, aiF 
transport aircraft, and possibly even helicopters. 
The EIDI system uses an interaction of magnetic fields and 
I 
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eddy currents that creates "an impulsive force on the skin of several 
! 
hundred pounds for less than a millisecond" (Lewis, 1984, p. 12). " .. 
a small amplitude, high-acceleration movement of the skin acts to 
shatter, debond, and expel the ice" (Lewis, 1984 , p. 12). In other 
words, the aircraft skin is "thumped" with enough force to knock off 
the ice. 
A major advantage of the EIDI system is a very low power 
requirement, no more than an aircraft's landing lights. There is no 
need for ducting or engine hot gas bleed requirements, nor is there 
any aerodynamic penalty as with pneumatic systems. The 
electromagnetic-impulse deicing system weight was equal or less 
than the current systems in use at the time, and the maintenance 
would be minimal as there are no moving parts. 
In 1985 Ames Research Center announced a research program 
to develop a low cost, lightweight, low power deicer for helicopter 
rotor blades A major problem for helicopters was a lack of all 
weather capability due to their sensitivity to rotor blade icing. 
Airplanes have used deicing devices for decades, but the weight and 
power requirements made helicopter manufacturers and operators 
reluctant to add icing protection to existing helicopters. 
q333 
Electro-Expulsive Deice System (EEDS). At Ames in 1985 an 
I 
electro-expulsive deicing system, invented by Leonard A. Haslim, 
was light enough and had such a low power requirement it became 
useful for helicopter deicing protection. 
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The electro-expulsive deicer boot is readily bondable onto almost any 
substrate, and requires no mechanical moving parts or pneum~tic 
inflation to effectively shed ice from aircraft surfaces. The new 
deicer takes the form of an elastometric boot that cyclically, 
expulsively, expands and throws off any accreted ice (Haslim, 1985, 
p. 15). 
The thin 20-50 mils, about 1/50 inch polyurethane elastomer 
deicing boot, normally lies flat against the surface. The low 
temperature rubber includes unbonded sections that have high-
voltage ribbon conductors embedded in knife-like slits in the rubber. 
When a bank of capacitors is discharged, a large pulse of electrical 
energy is discharged into the ribbon conductors inducing a large 
repulsive force that expands the elastomer strip and cleans any ice 
off the surface. About 3,000 amperes are discharged in a few 
milliseconds. The force is in excess of 7 5 Gs, enough force to knock 
off frost (Haslim personal interview). After the pulse, the elastic 
properties of the rubber cause it to rebound to the flat relaxed 
position. 
The next year, 1986, Ames expanded the possibilities for the 
electro-expulsive deicer boot to fixed-wing aircraft. The boot was 
usable for most any aircraft surface subject to icing. With the relaxed 
thickness of 1/50 inch, no detrimental effects on surfaces with 
turbulent air flow would be expected. In 1986 an application for 
patent was made on the electro-expulsive deicer system (Haslim, 
1986, p. 31). 
The system was developed for helicopter rotor blades, but the 
U. S. Navy recognized the possibilities of the system for high-
performance aircraft. NASA and the U. S. Navy flight tested the! 
i 
I 
system on a FI A-18 Hornet aircraft the next year, 198 7. In 198a 
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Haslim was named NASA inventor of the year (Fenrick, 1989, p. 1). 
The AmeslHaslim-developed Electro-Expulsive Deicing System; 
I 
(EEDS) was tested on the engine inlet of a Navy FIA-18 Hornet 
aircraft by the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD. Several 
FIA-18 engines (F-404) had been lost due to severe foreign-obj~ct 
damage when accreted ice broke away from the sharp inlet lip and 
were ingested by the engine. The Navy had lost five engines and the 
Canadians had lost 26 engines on their Fl A-18 aircraft due to ice 
ingestion (Haslim, 1988, p. 63-65). 
The Naval Air Systems Command provided all funding for the 
program. The EEDS system was installed on the engine inlet lip of a 
Fl A-18 Hornet aircraft and flown behind an Air Force NKC-135 icing 
spray tanker aircraft. The EEDS system not only pulverized any. 
accreted ice, it also acted to protect the aircraft from rain and sand 
erosion (Haslim, 1988, p. 63 ). When pulsed every three to five 
seconds, the system performed superbly as an anti-icing system as 
well as a deicing system. The system was also adaptable for civil 
transport aircraft. Northwest Airlines was preparing to test the EEDS 
system on a Boeing 727, and American Airlines was interested in a 
retrofit for its MD-80 aircraft (Haslim, 1989a , p. 4 ). 
EEDS Sea Trials. The interest in the electro-expulsive d~icer 
system EEDS expanded rapidly with the Naval Air Systems Command 
Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD, the U.S. Marines, the: U.S. 
Air Force, and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation all being involved. 
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By 198 9 the Naval Sea Systems Command was involved in expanding 
the possibilities for the EEDS. The system by now had been tested on 
an engine inlet of a Fl A-18 by the U.S. Navy and on Lewis Research 
Center's Twin Otter. The U.S. Air Force selected the EEDS for B-IB 
engine inlet icing protection. In a spinoff of the aircraft deicing 
system, the U.S. Navy initiated steps to retrofit critical areas of ships 
with EEDS. Dozens of lives were lost each year from sea-ice related 
accidents. Sea-ice accumulation reduced safety and effectiveness, 
caused instability and poor visibility. Ice mass can sink a ship from 
weight alone. An Aegis-guided missile Cruiser can rapidly accrete 1.5 
million pounds of sea-ice even in moderate icing conditions (Haslim, 
1989a, p. 4 ). Personnel doors, vertical launch hatches, and 
superstructures of Navy ships could be protected from ice using 
EEDS. A sample of EEDS was tested in the Arctic Simulation Chamber 
at Point Loma, CA. 
Ames, in cooperation with the state of Alaska, tested EEDS in 
the Bering Sea aboard the largest ship in the Alaska Fish and Wildlife 
protection program. The test lasted for eight days at sea from Kodiak 
to the Pribiloffs. The success of the tests led to a joint Ames and 
Alaska project. The Governor of Alaska made the project a priority 
and authorized the use of state government vessels to develop the 
EEDS to enhance the safety and utility of Alaskan fishing vessels. The 
Navy, seeing the results, intended to retrofit vulnerable areas of its 
LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushioned) hovercraft, and personnel and 
missile launch hatches on Aegis guided missile Cruisers (Haslim, 
1989b, p. 7). 
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Though lightweight, easily retrofittable, and requiring lo"! 
I 
power at low cost, the EEDS was nowhere mentioned as a usefuf 
system on general aviation aircraft. 
Control Systems 
Decoupled and Coordinated Control Systems. The control 
system used by airplanes has not changed since World War I. Rpll is 
controlled by differential acting ailerons on the outboard portion of 
the trailing edge of the wings. Pitch is controlled by an elevator on 
the trailing edge of the horizontal stabilizer or by moving the whole 
of the stabilator; and the yaw control is the rudder. The ailerons and 
elevator are combined into one pilot control, the stick or yoke, where 
the pilot pulls or pushes the stick to control pitch and moves the 
stick left or right, or turns the yoke left or right to control roll. 
Power, or throttle, is controlled by moving lever(s) or push rods 
forward or backward with forward always meaning more power. 
Here a problem may arise. Moving any one control affects 
everything else. Adding more power causes the speed to increase 
and the airplane to climb. Introducing a bank in the airplane causes a 
tum, but the airplane starts to lose altitude unless the airplane, is 
pitched upward. When an airplane's pitch is changed, the airspeed 
changes also. Increasing pitch lowers the airspeed. The controls: or 
the effects are coupled. When an airplane encounters wind shear, 
rapid changes take place in airspeed and altitude. Wind shear has 
been of significant consequence in many accidents during the final 
approach phase of flight. 
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Wind shear is a term that has become a part of the lexicon of 
most well read people in the last few years. Many airline accidents 
have had wind shear listed as a cause. The accident that prompted 
this study was that of Eastern Airlines Flight 66 at Kennedy airport 
in 197 5. Langley researchers studied the effect of independent or 
decoupled control of the flight path angle, pitch angle, and forward 
velocity. They used a decoupled longitudinal control system to 
provide constant gains to implement changes in thrust, elevator 
position, and symmetric spoilers (Miller, 1980, p. 12 ). 
NASA Langley's fixed-base simulation of the NASA modified 
Boeing B-737 Terminal Configured Vehicle (TCV) was used for the 
simulations. The TCV name was later changed to the Transport 
Systems Research Vehicle, or TSRV. Many people suggested the term 
"terminal" was too final to use with aircraft. Three research pilots 
flew the simulations based on a typical twin-engined jet transport 
using conventional controls and the advanced TCV control system. 
The simulations, using typical Kennedy Airport wind shear data, 
resulted in crashes about half the time due to stall when the research 
pilots pitched at too high an angle of attack. When the decoupled 
control system was used, the pilots were always able to complete the 
landing safely. The decoupled control system could be used with any 
airplane using servo driven actuators (Miller, 1980, p. 12). 
In 1981 Langley researchers continued the 1980 study of the 
positive effects of decoupling the longitudinal control system for air 
transport aircraft landing in conditions of wind shear. Decoupling the 
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longitudinal control system effectively reduces the pilots pitch 
control authority. As before, the control system uses constant gains 
to avoid onboard computation. Changes in thrust, elevator position, 
and symmetric spoilers were combined to provide independent •or 
decoupled control of the flight path angle, pitch angle, and forward 
velocity (Miller, 1981, p. 21). 
Using the fixed base simulation of the NASA Terminal 
Configured vehicle, the decoupled system was tested against a 
conventional control system and the advanced TCV control system. 
The simulated wind shear conditions were similar to those that 
occurred at the time of the crash of Eastern 66 at.Kennedy Airport in 
1975. The conventional control system and the advanced TCV control 
systems pitched at too high angles of attack and crashed about half 
the time without the decoupled controls. Using the decoupled system, 
the stall was avoided, and each landing using the decoupled controls 
was successful. There was no evidence that the pilot's performance 
was degraded due to reduced pitch authority (Miller, 1981, p. 21). 
Coordinated Elevator and Thrust Control. In 1982 Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Company, under contract to Langley, studied 
the effect of coordinating the pitch and power controls. In the 
longitudinal axis, the lack of control coordination between the 
elevator or pitch control and throttle control "results in undesirable 
activity of these controls and in flight path/ speed coupling errors" 
(Hueschen, 1982, p. 49). This lack of coordination can cause 
inadequate stability in some portions of the flight envelope. 
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Boeing also designed and used piloted simulation to verify an 
integrated elevator/thrust control system called Total Energy Control 
System, or TECS. A common generalized flight path/ speed control 
algorithm coordinated control for all longitudinal modes of the 
autopilot/autothrottle and the flight management system. 
The system design philosophy uses thrust to control the total energy 
of the aircraft and elevators to control the distribution of that 
energy between flight path and speed objectives (Hueschen, 1982, p. 
49). 
Thus, TECS eliminates speed and flight path deviations since 
uncoordinated control of either speed or pitch often affects the other. 
The hardware and software requirements of the coordinated 
system are simpler than in a conventional control system. This could 
lead to savings in engineering development, certification and flight 
tests, as well as equipment costs. Maintenance would be reduced 
over a conventional system, and performance would be improved. In 
wind shear conditions such as those causing the Eastern Airlines 
flight 66 crash at Kennedy airport in 1975, the Total Energy Control 
System (TECS) could be a life saver. 
Advanced Controls for Light Twin Engine Aircraft. As a 
flight instructor, this writer attends a biannual Certificated Flight 
Instructor (CFI) Recertification Course to update and renew his 
certificate. A course instructor always reminds the CFls that light 
twin engine aircraft are not so safe if an engine fails. Loss of an 
engine cuts the aircraft's climb rate by 80 percent. The extra speed 
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of the air over the wing caused by an operational engine increases 
lift, and if the engine quits, some lift as well as thrust are lost. In 
such an engine-out condition, if the propeller is windmilling and the 
landing gear and flaps are down- -or for that matter, any one of the 
above- -a light twin cannot remain airborne (FAA, 1978, p. 1). 
An engine failure is a major cause of fatal accidents for light 
twin engined aircraft. In 1983 Langley researchers conducted a 
piloted simulation study as the first phase of research to help solve 
the problem. The simulation aerodynamic model was a generic light 
twin engine airplane. The data for the simulation came from tests in 
Langley's 30-60 foot wind tunnel and flight data from two NASA 
owned aircraft. Langley's General Aviation Simulator (GAS) motion-
based simulation cockpit had three degrees of motion and an out-
the-window terrain board based visual simulation. 
The first step explored the effects on engine out controllability 
and handling characteristics. Although the control input forces were 
found to be substantial, control was possible. The greatest difficulty 
was found to be the mental task of determining the "dead" engine. 
Multi-engine flight training teaches pilots to reduce drag by 
immediately identifying the inoperative engine and feathering the 
propeller as quickly as possible. This puts a high workload on a pilot 
who is now in a high stress environment. When the engine failure 
happens close to the ground, a fatal blunder can occur when the pilot 
feathers the wrong propeller. Most pilots in the study committed this 
type of blunder in the simulation. 
A goal of this study was to evaluate automatic control systems 
to reduce the pilot workload in engine-out situations. With reduced 
l 
workload it was expected that potentially fatal blunders would be 
I 
! 
reduced. In 1984 Langley researchers continued the research o* 
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engine-out safety problems for light twin aircraft. This study 
simulated the effect of total pressure sensors in the slipstream to 
compensate for the asymmetric power caused by the loss of an : 
engine. The automatic trim system would sense any thrust 
differential and change the rudder, aileron, and elevator trim tab 
positions for the optimal trim condition. The aerodynamic simulation 
was developed using data from wind tunnel tests and qualitative 
flight tests using two NASA aircraft. The piloted simulation of a 
generic light twin was conducted in the Langley General Aviation 
Simulator. Research pilots reported reduced pilot workload and 
easier controllability using the automatic trim system. The system 
would be most useful and beneficial on takeoff where doing the 
proper thing quickly under high stress conditions can be the 
difference in life or death (Stewart, 1984, pp. 9, 10). 
Advanced Instrumentation 
The advances in display technology and in microprocessors 
created a revolution in aircraft display technology in the 1980s~ The 
i 
terms "glass cockpit" and Electronic Flight Instrumentation System 
(EFIS) became reality and common during the decade. Cathode ray 
tube ( CRT) and other advanced display technologies became standard 
in the industry. At the beginning of the decade, there were eleqtronic 
I 
versions of the Attitude Director Indicator (ADI), and Horizontal 
I 
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! 
I 
I 
Situation Indicator (HSI), the electronic ADI or EADI and EHSI. ..Ait the 
I 
end of the decade, there were Primary Flight Displays (PDF's) an;d 
I 
I 
Flight Management Systems. 
"Fo1low Me" Box Display for General Aviation. General 
aviation has always had an accident rate greater than air transport 
aircraft. Langley, in 1981, attempted to improve GA flight safety by 
developing a simplified method for precise enroute navigation or 
terminal area control of general aviation aircraft by integrating 
microprocessors with advanced displays to provide a pictorial path-
in-the-sky display format (Adams, 1981, p. 26). 
The usual pictorial display of flight path information in the 
terminal area is an extended line from the aircraft symbol to be 
followed by the pilot. The "Follow Me" box provided simplicity with 
more information along with providing a target equivalent to a flight 
director signal. The "Follow Me" box's three dimensional shape 
provided very sensitive indications of small displacement errors. If 
you could see the top, bottom, or sides of the box, then you were off 
course. Roll information was provided by the square shape of the 
box, and the box location provided pitch and heading information. 
All information for the control of the aircraft was provided by 
the box symbol. The pilot tried to fly into the box. By shortening the 
distance, the box was in front of the aircraft, for tighter control bf the 
I 
aircraft. The two box format was tested and documented in a gJneral 
aviation context both in simulators and flight tests. Using a "Follow 
Me" box located four nautical miles ahead of the aircraft, a pilot was 
i 
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i 
offered relative ease in finding and following the correct flight gath. 
i 
A final approach box located 300 meters ahead of the aircraft I 
provided precise control of a curved, descending final approach :to a 
30 meter decision height (Adams, 1981, p. 26). 
Possibly because of NASA's decision to do away with its g~neral 
aviation program, this effort to improve the safety of GA aircraft was 
not continued (Czaplyski, 1993, p. 68). By 1989 Langley was again 
concerned with GA safety and the fact that GA and air taxi operations 
comprised 7 4 percent of all air traffic operations (Wallace, 1993, p. 
67). This time the goals were to develop new flight control and . 
display systems and to reduce initial· training and recurring practice 
requirements (Stewart, 1989a, p. 19). 
Highway in the Sky (HITS), & "Ez Fly" System. As mentioned 
before, GA has always been the least safe way to fly. Part of the 
problem has been the low time experience of most general aviation 
pilots. Also, many general aviation pilots do not fly regularly, and 
recent experience is necessary for proficiency. Researchers using 
Langley's General aviation Simulator (GAS) developed new flign.t 
control and display concepts to make flying more user friendly :and 
intuitive. The pictorial display was a Highway In The Sky, or HITS, at 
first complete with a road and lane markings, a horizon line, and 
! 
even telephone poles along the right side. The telephone poles ~ere 
an altitude cue. The reason for the highway was the belief that ifor 
GA to recover and thrive, flying must use the same motor skill~ as 
those used in driving (Wallace, 1993, p. 66). It sounds like a video 
driving game, but it worked. And no quarters were needed! 
The test subjects ranged from NASA research pilots to 
nonpilots. With no practice to emphasize instinctive reactions, each 
pilot flew two runs using HITS as a head-up display (HUD). 
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HUDs are projections, focused at infinity with images or data in 
the line of sight of a pilot so he can see as he looks forward through 
the wind screen. The first run used a decoupled fly-by-wire control 
system called Ez-Fly. The Ez-Fly system has responses that resemble 
an automobile. Flight director arrows guide the pilot to the center of 
the "highway" unless displaced by higher priority messages (Stewart, 
1989b, 92). 
A test subject, on a first attempt without any training, made a 
takeoff, flew a race track type path through simulated clouds, and 
made an acceptable landing. Then using the one flight experience, the 
test subject flew the conventional control system, but using the HITS 
display, completed about 75 percent of the flight. But it crashed short 
of the runway. Many nonpilots could fly takeoff to landing with both 
EZ-Fly and HITS, but most crashed using conventional controls and 
HITS (Stewart, 1989b, 93 ). 
In the March, 1993 issue of AOPA Pilot, Bruce Holmes, 
Assistant Director of Aeronautics at Langley Research Center, ~as 
quoted as saying a "technical revolution the likes of which we 
haven't seen in the history of mankind" might tum around the • 
prospects of general aviation. (Wallace, 1993, p. 65) The EZ 
Fly/Highway In The Sky display, illustrated in the article, resembled 
a marriage of the "Follow Me" box and the Highway in the Sky. : 
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Localizer Needle Display Enhancement. Langley Research 
Center was researching advanced displays in 1980. An enhancement 
to the localizer needle of the Instrument Landing System was 
developed as an aid to general aviation (GA) pilots. GA pilots can land 
as well as airline pilots when the weather is bad and the clouds are 
low by using an instrument landing system (ILS) approach. For the 
airline pilot the approach is usually accomplished by the autopilot. 
For smaller aircraft, the instrument approach is flown manually. 
A standard instrument landing system (ILS) is composed of 
two parts. The glide-slope function tells the pilot whether he is on 
the correct line and angle to get to the runway at .the proper position 
to land safely. The localizer tells the pilot whether he is on the 
runway center line. The ILS indicator display presents only deviation 
in the form of a needle deflection. There is no rate of deviation for 
either glide-slope or localizer. The lack of deviation rate information 
increases the pilot workload and decreases tracking performance. 
The closer the pilot gets to the runway the more sensitive the 
ILS display, and often wind shear changes wind speed and direction 
leading to pilot induced oscillations (PIO) - -the results of which can 
be a missed approach or a crash. 
The required heading changes for maintaining or regaining the 
localizer are found by trial and error, and they can vary as the · 
aircraft descends into changing winds. The Langley designed pseudo 
command tracking indicator (PCTI) is an enhancement of a standard 
ILS display with a rate needle attached to the end of the localizer 
needle. "The display is configured so as to present raw deviation 
data, localizer deviation rate, and a pseudo tum command" (Hinton, 
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1980, p. 18 ). The farther the localizer rate needle is from the 
centerline, the greater the tum needed to achieve the center linJ. 
In a simulation study, eight pilots flew five approaches with the 
conventional display and then five approaches using the PCTI. The 
average rms tracking error using the PCTI was about half the error 
using the conventional display. 
Stall Speed Indicator. Ames Research Center developed a 
system in 1980 to supply the pilot with a continuous display of. 
indicated stall speed. The stall speed indicator developed at NA~A 
Ames utilized measurements of : 
• normal acceleration 
• aircraft configuration 
• engine power 
• atmospheric measurements 
• and known aircraft characteristics. 
The stall speed indicator, when co-located with the 
conventional airspeed indicator, gives the "pilot instantaneous 
information as to his safety margin from stall" (Jackson, 1980, p. 38). 
It was concluded, that with this system a conventional audible ~tall 
warning sensor was not needed on the aircraft. This writer discl!grees 
I 
because it would add to the workload~ When tested on a Cessna: 402B 
I 
aircraft, the system gave reasonably accurate stall speeds for normal 
I 
and accelerated stalls. The differences between actual and indicated 
stall speeds was usually within two knots and never off more than 
four knots (Jackson, 1980, p. 38). 
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Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) LaRC 
One afternoon years ago on approach to Roanoke, Virginia's 
Woodrum Airport runway 33, this writer was vectored to a straight-
in approach ahead of a Learjet. Since he was in a much slower 
Beechcraft C-23 Sundowner, the approach controller was asking for 
more speed and generally trying to hurry things along. Finally, the 
hand-off to tower was given. "Contact tower now on one-one-eight-
point-three." This writer tried again and again but received no 
acknowledgment. By then he was on about a three mile final and he 
heard the tower acknowledge the Learjet. Another attempt to contact 
the Roanoke tower failed, and then a Cessna C-150 two place trainer, 
lower than the Beechcraft, cut in front turning onto final approach. 
This was enough, and a go-around was announced with the 
Sundowner continuing on the runway heading. In a minute or two 
tower finally acknowledged and apologized for the mix-up. Thi~ 
I 
event convinced the writer it sure would be nice if the pilots lclew 
I 
what the controllers know. 
In the 80s decade, there were two NASA developed displays 
called Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). The CDTI 
developed at Ames Research Center was a 3-dimensional symbolic 
display. A top view pictorial display with the same name was 
1 
developed at Langley Research Center. 
In 1980 Langley and the FAA, in a joint program, investigated 
the benefits of a flight crew knowing the positions of surrounding 
traffic. The traffic display presented an overhead view of airer¢ 
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positions, and computers generated previous and expected future 
flight paths of all traffic, as well as weather and ground runway 
traffic. The instrument for the display was the electronic horizontal 
situation indicator (EHSI) found in all air transport type aircraft. 
Electronic displays and uplink/ downlink data-links were 
necessary for the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) to be 
feasible. Thus the system could not be implemented until mode-S 
transponders became operational. Flight tests were flown using 
NASA's TCV Boeing B-737 research aircraft. The results showed a 
substantial increase in the "flight crew's overall situation awareness 
and provided ample lead time for detecting and resolving conflicts" 
(Hatfield, 1980, p. 12). Also it was found that monitoring the CDTI 
did not adversely affect other crew tasks. Other potential benefits 
noted were a possible increased airway capacity and greater 
operational efficiency. As this was being compiled in January 1993, 
the writer could not escape reminders of the mid-air collisions in the 
time since this research was done. The Cerritos Mid-air collision and 
the runway collision at LAX, Los Angeles International Airport, when 
an airliner landed on top of a commuter airplane on its takeoff roll 
are two examples of accidents that might have been prevented by 
CDTI. 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) Ames 
Ames conducted a series of studies in 1981 to examine the 
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types of evasion maneuvers pilots would make in different conflict 
I 
situations. The two-dimensional top view cockpit display of traffic 
information was used to compare pilot intuitive maneuver decisions 
with those of automatic collision avoidance algorithms. These 
algorithms were designed to "maximize the minimum miss distance 
between aircraft" (Ellis & Palmer, 1981, p. 35 ). Pilots intuitively 
maneuver to reduce the time to resolve the conflict even if that takes 
them across the collision course. These conflicting decision patterns 
enhance the potential of pilot errors. 
In 1982 Ames developed a three-dimensional prospective 
display to show vertical as well as horizontal traffic conflict 
information. The display shows traffic from a point above and behind 
a pilot's own aircraft. The pilot's aircraft is shown as a fixed symbol, 
and the traffic moves around it. In comparing pilot's composite 
avoidance maneuvers with the perspective display and the mostly 
horizontal maneuvers of the plan-view display, a bias due to the 
display appears to affect the chosen avoidance maneuver. Using the 
perspective display, decisions were made 10 to 20 percent faster. 
Also, the perspective display reduces the pilot's perception of a 
collision threat which lessens the number of avoidance maneuvers 
selected (Ellis & Palmer, 1982, p. 18). One concern was "the fear that 
its presence might give the pilot greater autonomy and opportunity 
! 
to question or ignore air traffic control commands" (Stokes & 
I 
Wickens, 1988, pp. 393, 394 ). To this writer, this sounds as if the 
"mushroom" method of management is preferred by air traffic 
control. Another concern was whether the display would add to the 
pilot workload and decrease outside scan time. 
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Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
In 19~6 Ames Research Center became the clearing house. for 
the FAA's airborne Traffic Alert and Collision-Avoidance System 
TCAS. TCAS is a stand alone system that can detect the presence of 
another transponder-equipped aircraft near enough to be a collision 
threat. TCAS I provided a visual display showing relative position, 
distance, and altitude of the other aircraft. The Ames' TCAS II study 
evaluated the closure rates and flight geometry of the other aircraft 
relative to itself, and if a collision threat was calculated, issued yisual 
i 
and verbal vertical maneuver information to the pilot. TCAS III will, 
when implemented, also include lateral maneuvers. 
The Ames/FAA program involved close cooperation among 
avionics manufacturers, airlines, the Air Transport Association 
(ATA), the FAA, and NASA. TCAS algorithms were provided by MIT's 
Lincoln Laboratories. ATA supplied the display hardware used, and 
flight crews were supplied by the ATA member carriers in the 1FAA's 
Limited Implementation Program. Ames supplied a full-mission 
flight and Air Traffic Control (ATC) simulation under a variety of 
conditions. "The principal independent variable is the amount of 
information to be provided to flight crews concerning traffic 
encounters" (Billings & Chappell, 1986, p. 44 ). The initial data 
collection was made in early fiscal year FY-8 7. i 
1987 saw TCAS coming closer to deployment. Ames ReseJrch 
Center continued the evaluation. The Federal Aeronautics 
Administration (FAA) developed TCAS in safe, controlled, reali~tic 
! 
operational situations where a comprehensive set of conflict 
scenarios were simulated. NASA, the FAA, and the industry 
conducted full-mission simulations of the TCAS II system which 
" 
provides vertical guidance only. The simulations showed "a 
74 
significant potential for increased safety in flight by reducing the 
number of unsafe separation situations" (Chappell & Scott, 1986, p. 
41 ). Pilot response time was quicker than the five second design 
specification, but excessive altitude deviations observed could cause 
operational problems. 
The Ames/FAA program continued through 1989 during 
which Ames researchers and current airline crews conducted 
experiments that explored: 
1. TCAS II with part and full-time traffic display, and with no · 
traffic display, just maneuver information; 
2. pilot performance with and without target areas displayed on the 
vertical speed indicator; 
3. pilot execution of the commanded maneuvers in different 
aircraft performance regimes (Chappell, 1989, p. 53). 
Diagnostic Expert Fault Monitoring System 
In 1988 Langley researchers developed an onboard fault 
monitoring and diagnosis system using artificial intelligence to kid 
crews of air transport aircraft. The prototype, called "Faultfinder," 
detected and diagnosed failures in engine and hydraulic syste~s of a 
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generic aircraft. The two-stage system used rules to diagnose known 
faults and model-based reasoning to diagnose unknown faults. 
Using eight accident cases, the faults were reconstructed to 
produce a simulation of the accident. The expert system used 
simulations to produce hypotheses of the probable cause. These 
hypotheses were compared to the actual cause as determined by the 
NTSB. The system correctly diagnosed seven of eight cases. The first 
stage diagnosed two of seven test cases, both on turbine blade 
separation. Stage two correctly diagnosed two fan failures, one each 
on engine separation, foreign object damage (FOO), and a bearing 
failure. Multiple hypotheses were given in several cases (Schutte, 
1988, p. 78). 
Takeoff Performance Monitoring System TOPMS 
Several fatal accidents on record have dealt with flight crew 
attempts to continue a takeoff when the aircraft was not performing 
properly. The crash of an Air Florida B-7 37 at Washington National 
Airport January 13, 1982 and the Delta B-727 crash at Dallas in 1989 
are examples. The Air Florida crash was due to the engines being set 
at less than normal takeoff thrust due to a partially blocked probe 
creating false high thrust readings (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988, p. 
195 ). At Dallas the Delta crew failed to set the proper flap position. 
In both cases the crews failed to make a decision to abort when the 
aircraft could not takeoff. Neither captain recognized there was a 
problem. 
i 
The Takeoff Performance Monitoring System (TOPMS) wo~ld 
! 
provide the crew with information on how the aircraft was I 
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performing, "information pertinent to their decision to continue 'or 
reject a takeofr' (Middleton & Srivatsan, 1987, p. 57). An algorithm 
was developed to compute, organize, and send takeoff performance 
data to the electronic horizontal situation indicator EHSI as a head 
down display. This navigational instrument could be used for this 
display during the takeoff phase of a flight. The TOPMS display 
provided a runway graphic overlaid with predictive and advisory 
information using symbols and numeric information. The information 
included: 
• current position on the runway, 
• current indicated air speed, 
• predicted location where decision speed (Vl) would be 
reached, 
• predicted location where rotation speed (VR) would be 
reached, 
• balanced field length and ground roll limit for reaching 
VR, 
• predicted stop point for abort from current conditions, 
• engine failure flags, 
• and an overall situation advisory flag. 
The overall situation flag recommended continuation or rejectioµ of 
i 
the takeoff. One of the abort flags was a familiar red octagonal sitop 
sign (Middleton & Srivatsan, 1986, p. 49). 
Thirty two professional pilots evaluated the TO PMS. display in 
i 
Langley's Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) real-timei 
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simulator. The pilots used a rating scale having a range from "1" 
meaning excellent, to "10" for unsuitable. The criteria for evaluation 
"included credibility, ease of comprehension, suitability for task, and 
pilot comments" (Middleton, 1986, p. 49). 
A test evaluation consisted of twenty takeoff simulations 
where the pilot flew, and twenty where the pilot was not flying but 
was monitoring the takeoff. Test conditions simulated runway 
conditions that varied from dry to wet to slushy. Used were a range 
of ambient temperatures, pressure altitudes, and runway lengths. 
Degraded acceleration performance including engine failure was 
simulated. 
The overall rating was 2. 92 where 3.0 was good. Comments and 
suggestions were being incorporated into a revised display. In an 
interview in 1987, David Middleton mentioned that the professional 
pilots had positive comments about the information given but did not 
like the rejection advisory, especially the stop sign. The pilots felt 
that the abort decision was theirs to make. The pilots who flew as 
two-man crews also recommended that the pilot not flying should 
have primary display monitoring responsibility, and the pilot flying 
should have a simplified head-up TOPMS display. This was 
implemented in a follow-up study with 17 pilots whose "ratings and 
comments were quite favorable" (Middleton & Srivatsan, 1987, p. 
57). The head-up display tested in 1987 was a simplified version of 
the head-down display previously tested. The HUD and head-down 
display were tested by 17 invited pilots who rated them good to 
very good. They liked the system because it displayed needed 
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information in a form that made for quick and easy comprehension 
(Middleton & Srivatsan, 1987, p. 60). 
During the TOPMS research program, TOPMS displays were 
flown by 41 pilots from the United States Air Force, NASA, airlines, 
Federal Aeronautics Administration (FAA), and industry pilots. The 
Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) B-737 simulator was 
used for all the simulated flights. The general feeling of the 
evaluation pilots was the display would require low mental effort 
and would provide critical information for takeoff/ abort decisions. 
The TOPMS system was later flown in the head-down version on 
board NASA's B-737 (Middleton, 1988, p. 74). 
This writer regrets that the TOPMS display, which might have 
prevented the Air Florida accident in Washington, the Delta accident 
in Dallas, the Continental accident in Denver, and the USAIR accident 
in New York, may be dead from a fear of product liability lawsuits. 
Crashworthy and Fireworthy Structures 
Research 
Impact Dynamics Research Facility. For several years Langley 
Research Center has researched crashworthy structures. The most 
famous program was the general aviation crash tests of the 1970s. 
The Impact Dynamics Research Facility at Langley Research was 
originally an astronaut training facility for the Apollo Lunar Program 
for Lunar landing simulations .. The structure is an A-frame 230 feet 
high and 400 feet long. For impact dynamics studies, full scale 
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scale aircraft were supported by cables and swung pendulum-style 
onto the concrete runway below. 
The two cables pivot point was at the 21 7 foot level and the 
aircraft were pulled back to a height determined by the test. Just 
before impact the cables were released by pyrotechnics and the 
aircraft swung pendulum-style into the ground. It was possible to 
change the angle of impact from 0° to about 60°. Air speeds varied 
up to 65 mph by varying the pullback height. With rocket assist, 
speeds up to 95 mph were possible. 
The pitch, roll, and yaw were varied by changing the support 
cable harness. Data from onboard instrumentation was transmitted to 
the control room by hard-wire through an umbilical from the crash 
aircraft, up through the A-frame support structure. Photo data were 
obtained by still and motion picture cameras mounted above the A-
frame, ground cameras, and cameras mounted inside the crash test 
aircraft. 
AnaJysis of Crash Impact Dynamics. During the series of 
crash dynamics tests, "a simplified analysis of the complicated crash 
scenario was developed based on impulse-momentum relationships" 
(Carden, 1983, p. 67). A triangular acceleration time impulse was 
assumed, and the analysis and crash test data agreed closely. As a 
result of the crash dynamics program, the National Transportation 
Safety Board undertook a program to identify a range of accident 
scenarios where it may be possible to design for passenger 
survivability. 
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Load Limiting Subfloor Structure. Since 1972, Langley 
Impact Dynamics Research Facility researchers have conducted a 
full-scale crash test program that included 32 general aviation 
aircraft, two air transport tests and tests using USAF F-111 escape 
modules. One of the findings was that forward forces were not the 
real killer in aircraft crashes. The real killer is the vertical forces on 
crew and passengers when the aircraft "slaps down" on impact. A 
human can withstand 45 Gs horizontally, 25 Gs vertically, and 20 Gs 
laterally (Ethell, 1986). This NASA Langley study involved the design 
and construction of five load-limiting structures 
" . . . to dissipate kinetic energy by appropriate structural 
arrangement, astute shaping of geometry of structural elements, or 
incorporating clever energy dissipating devices"(Carden, 1980, p. 
17). 
The structural concepts would replace a currently used 
subfloor structure. The floor structure itself would still be strong to 
maintain the aircraft and seat integrity. The subfloor would collapse 
in a controlled manner to absorb the loads in the event of a crash. 
One of the more promising modified structural concepts was a 
"notched joint" sine-wave shaped aluminum subfloor structure that 
supposedly reduced vertical loading to 18 Gs (Carden, 1980, p. 17). 
A sample of this structure is in the possession of this researcher. 
Test results of the five specimen structures indicated they 
performed as hoped with the floor remaining intact throughout the 
' 
I 
loading. The crush-type structure collapsed at a load level below a 
standard structure with a uniform magnitude throughout the test. 
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Later dynamic drop tests were conducted with vertical velocities up 
to 9 meters/second (Carden, 1980, p. 17). 
Vertical Drop Test of Boeing 707 
Fuselage Section. In 1983, to "determine structural, seat, and 
occupant response to vertical crash loads," (Williams, 1983, p. 66) a 
12 foot, 5,000 pound, section of a Boeing 707 was dropped vertically 
at the Langley Impact Dynamics Research Facility. The research was 
in preparation of the Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) 
program. In the CID program a Boeing 720 was flown by remote 
control to a "controlled" gear up landing on the desert floor at 
Edwards Air Force Base. 
The height was adjusted to give a vertical speed of 20 feet per 
second. The fuselage section was loaded with seats, anthropomorphic 
dummies and instrumentation. The drop caused the fuselage beneath 
the floor to collapse inward approximately two feet. "Bending failures 
occurred along the centerline of the baggage compartment floor and 
on both sides of the fuselage about four feet below the floor" 
(Williams, 1983, p. 67). The upper fuselage, cabin floor, and seats 
suffered no apparent damage. The crushing of the lower fuselage 
prevented undue forces to be transmitted to the cabin floor. The 
vertical pelvic accelerations experienced by the anthropomorphic 
dummies ranged from 6.5 Gs to 8.0 Gs. These accelerations were well 
below the accepted value of 25 Gs for neck or back fractures. 
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StructuraJ Analysis of Jet Transport 
Contro1led Impact Demonstration. In 1986 Langley 
researchers conducted a study to model jet transport crash dynamics 
by comparing pre-impact scenarios of the Controlled Impact 
Demonstration (CID) with actual CID data. Langley worked in 
cooperation with the Federal Aeronautics Administration (FM) and 
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company. 
NASA Langley Impact Dynamics Branch and the FM 
attempted to "quantitatively assess jet transport airplane crash 
dynamics using nonlinear dynamic finite element computer codes" 
(Fasannella, 1986, p. 79). Experimental data came from the 
FAA/NASA Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) remotely-piloted 
Boeing 720 jet transport instrumented with more than 350 crash 
sensors. 
Boeing used a hybrid finite-element airplane crash model: 
DYCAST (DYnamic Crash Analysis of STructures) developed by 
Grumman under a NASA Langley contract. Three transport fuselage 
sections were dropped vertically with impact velocities of 20 feet per 
second from Langley's Impact Dynamics tower. These tests were 
modeled and analyzed using DYCAST. This was to provide nonlinear 
su bfloor crush springs for the CID model. 
It was planned that the CID impact would be fuselage first with 
wings level. That was not the case. The number one engine on tbe 
left wing impacted first, with the aircraft in a thirteen degree yaw to 
i 
the left. The anomaly was caused by an oscillation in roll. The 
resulting impact was not as "controlled" as the researchers had · 
hoped. There was a spectacular fire. It lasted only 10 seconds, ~d 
I 
because of the antimisting fuel it was only half as hot as a normal 
fire. The problem was that the "half as hot" was 700° F and a 
passenger could not be half as dead. The DYCAST prediction of a 
maximum G loading of 1 7 near the nose and a minimum of five in 
the tail area of the B-720 was close, but high in comparison to the 
CID data. This may have been a result of the rolling motion 
introduced by the aircraft not impacting with the wings level. 
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However, NASA Langley researchers were pleased with the 
agreement between the DYCAST model results and the CID 
experimental data. They found the model to be useful and valid for 
assessing the crash dynamics of large transport aircraft. 
Crash Tests of All-Composite Helicopter Structures. In 198 7 
in support of the United States Army's Advanced Composite 
Airframe Program (ACAP), researchers at Langley's Impact Dynamics 
Facility tested two fully-instrumented, all composite, full-scale 
helicopter airframes. One airframe was built by Bell Helicopter 
Textron, and the other was a Sikorsky Aircraft structure. The 
experimental utility helicopters used advanced composites in both 
primary and secondary structures. Primary structures are strength-
critical, and secondary structures are stiffness-critical. 
The Sikorsky ASAP airframe was dropped vertically with a 
flight path velocity of 38 ft/sec, 10° right roll, and 10° pitch up 
attitude. The Bell ASAP airframe had a flight path angle of -57°, a 
flight path velocity of 48.1 ft/ sec, and the same pitch and roll angles 
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as the Sikorsky ASAP. Initial evaluation indicated the survivable 
load and structural integrity criteria were met (Carden, 1987, p. 92). 
Static Response of Composite Floor Sections. Also in 1987, 
Langley researchers conducted a program to test the crashworthiness 
of primary composite fuselage structures. Composite materials have 
been used for years for secondary, or stiffness-critical structures. 
Primary or strength critical structures of advanced composites may 
be used in some next generation aircraft. Experimental and analytical 
studies of the crashworthiness of composite structures were 
conducted using two circular 6-foot diameter graphite/ epoxy 
subfloor sections with identical skeletal frameworks. One section had 
a graphite/ epoxy skin bonded and riveted to the framework and 
stringers. The skinned specimen had about one forth the load 
deflection as the non-skinned frame. 
The crash computer program DYCAST (Dynamic Crash Analysis 
of Structures) was used to predict the load deflection response, and 
the best correlation for the skinned section did not include out-'-of-
plane or twisting displacements. For the non-skinned frame the best 
analytical/experimental correlation occurred when the frame bent 
out of plane but did not twist ( Carden , 198 7, p. 120 ). 
Fireworthy Structures Research 
Fire-Blocking Mechanisms for Seats. In 1982 Ames Research 
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Center developed aircraft seat cushioning that was fireworthy by the 
use of fire-blocking mechanisms. Aircraft seats should be as fire 
resistant as possible while providing maximum fire protection with 
minimum weight. It was found that aluminized thermally stable 
fabrics used with urethane foams had low weight and were cost 
effective. To determine cost effectiveness a full scale model and 
computer-based algorithm were developed and tested at Douglas 
Aircraft. The study concluded polyurethane-based cushions with a 
fire blocking layer were the most desirable (Kourtides, 1982, p. 66 ). 
Of course, the most desirable cushioning material would not have any 
polyurethane. In a fire, polyurethane foam emits lethal hydrogen 
cyanide gas as well as other toxic vapors. 
Fireworthy/Crashworthy Seat Cushioning. In 1986 Ames 
developed a comfortable aircraft seat with energy absorbing 
characteristics without using polyurethane foam. Ames researchers 
invented a crashworthy seat using elliptical spring supports made of 
graphite-epoxy surrounded by a fire-resistant polyimide belt. 
"Crashworthy characteristics are imparted to the cushioning by 
incorporating a layer of energy-absorbing visco-elastic layers 
between the nested, elliptical strings (sic)" (Haslim, 1986, p. 32). 
Note: the word "strings" should be "springs." Not only was the seat 
fire-resistant and energy-absorbing, it was easy to make and 
maintain. It was lightweight and structurally strong. 
By 1988, the Ames-developed fire-retardant aircraft seat 
cushioning had been patented. The cushioning was developed for 
aircraft seating but the concept also attracted interest from the · 
automobile industry. Several airline and automobile companies · 
requested prototypes of the cushioning for evaluation, and three 
Fortune 500 material companies have applied for manufacturing 
licenses to produce the cushioning (Haslim, 1989, p. 8). 
Lightweight, Fire-Resistant Aircraft 
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Interior Panels. Prior to 1990 aircraft interiors were built 
primarily of epoxy resin and fiberglass. It was well known these 
materials emitted large amounts of heat, toxic gases, and smoke 
when exposed to fire. In 1983 NASA Ames Research Center, in 
cooperation with the FAA and several commercial companies, 
developed aircraft panel face-sheets that were lighter than fiberglass 
panels used at the time and were more fire-resistant. The research 
was done in cooperation with: 
• Federal Aeronautics Administration (FAA) 
• American Cyanamid (resin development) 
• Hercules, Inc. (prepreg graphite fiber) 
• Douglas Aircraft ( decorative film development) 
• Lockheed Corp. ( decorative film development). 
The advanced panel was faced with graphite fiber sheets 
impregnated with polystyrylpyridine (PSP) resin. The panel was 
tested and compared to a baseline epoxy glass panel and a phenolic-
glass panel. The three panels were subjected to a heat flux of 5: watts 
per square centimeter. The epoxy glass and phenolic glass panels 
were destroyed, but the advanced panel showed almost no da~age. 
! 
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Large scale panels were constructed using a modified PSP resin and 
tested in the FAA's C-133 at the FAA Technical Center at Atlantic 
City, NJ. The use of the graphite/PSP panels would save 
approximately 500 pounds in each wide-body aircraft, and reduce 
fuel by 2.5 million gallons per year for a 300 aircraft wide-body fleet 
(Kourtides, 1983, p. 49). 
By 1989 the FAA enacted requirements that aircraft interiors 
meet maximum heat-release rate and total heat release of 65 
kW/m2 and 65 kW-min/m2 respectively. In a cooperative program 
between Ames Research Center and the FAA, materials similar to the 
1983 materials were developed to meet the standards. The materials 
use graphite fibers and a resin matrix of 
bismaleimide/vinylpolystrylpyride (VPSP/BMI) at a ratio of 65/35. 
The newly developed resin cured at 177° C, in the conventional 
curing equipment (Kourtides, 1989, p. 170). 
Antimisting Kerosene 
Prevention is probably the best way to protect against fire 
damage. A fire prevention program spanning the 1980s used 
antimisting kerosene research. In 1980 Lewis Research Center, the 
FAA and Pratt Whitney Aircraft Group evaluated Jet A fuel additives 
to inhibit break up of fuel into tiny droplets or mist in an airplane 
crash. Jet A is the standard aeronautics jet fuel, and it is kerosene. 
The fuels with these additives are generically called antimisting 
kerosenes, or AMK. The misting of jet fuel is the cause of the deadly 
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fires often accompanying airplane crashes. However, these addi~ives 
i 
do not work in engine combustors. The NASA Lewis role in this istudy 
was to help make the jet engines and antimisting kerosenes 
compatible. 
Although several additives were developed and evaluated by 
the FAA, AMK additive FM-9, developed by the Imperial Chemical 
Industries and the Royal Aircraft Establishment of Great Britain, was 
chosen for testing in engine fuel systems. "AMK additives are large 
polymeric molecules with molecular weights of about 5 million" 
(Schmidt, 1980, p. 4 ). These large molecules are very resistant to 
misting, but cannot be burned in jet engines. They must be broken 
down or degraded before the fuel can be used in jet engines. To 
accomplish this the undegraded AMK is subjected to repeated 
mechanical shear forces to make the fuel compatible with jet engines. 
This writer was at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) in 
May 1984, just before the Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID), 
when Rogers Smith, a NASA research pilot, told him of the problems 
with degrading the AMK kerosene and of the delay it was causing. 
The joke around Dryden was that CID should mean "Crash In Desert." 
This was a prophetic belief. 
The AMK fuel would store in the aircraft fuel tanks and then 
flow through degraders before being introduced in the jet engine 
combustors. Thus the bulk of the fuel would be in the undegracled 
form in the event of a crash, and it was hoped this would prevdnt the 
i 
tragic conflagrations that too often occur in air transport crashes. 
Lewis contracted with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group of United 
Technologies Corporation (UTC) to: 
• develop methods to degrade AMK, 
• and evaluate the effect of degraded AMK on the 
performance of the fuel system of the JT8D engine. 
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The results of the test program showed that it should be 
possible to operate JT8D engine on degraded FM-9 AMK fuel, if 
practical methods of degrading the AMK could be developed. 
Additional testing was suggested to determine the long term effects 
of AMK on fuel systems. This research was four years in advance of 
the CID program in 1984 (Schmidt, 1980, p. 4 ). 
General Aviation (GA) Safety Research 
General aviation is the term applied to all aircraft activity 
which is not military or scheduled air transport. This activity 
includes everything from a yellow Piper Cub flown out of a farmer's 
pasture, to a 22.35 million dollar Falcon 900 that will take a Fortune 
500 executive across country nonstop. It also includes non-scheduled 
air-taxi operations. According to 1990 AOPA figures, general aviation 
aircraft, after a decade of decline, flew twice as many hours as air 
carriers, carried almost a quarter of the passengers flown, and used 
less than ten percent of the fuel. Air carrier aircraft make up less 
than three percent of the active aircraft in the civil fleet. The d~cline 
in general aviation in the 1980s can be shown in the loss of more 
than 100,000 pilots during the decade and a decline in aircraft 
shipments from almost 12,000 in 1980 to just over 1,000 in 1990. 
Statistically, general aviation is a very large part of aeronautics. 
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During the decade of the 1970s, general aviation aircraft sales 
experienced a boom, and NASA dedicated a general aviation research 
program. But in 1981, NASA made a conscious decision to do away 
with its general aviation program (Czaplyski, 1993, p. 68). NASA 
general aviation research trailed off to isolated studies as the 80s 
rolled by. Not only did NASA general aviation programs dry up, but 
as noted above, the same happened to the U.S. general aviation 
industry. 
When this writer instructs at Certificated Flight Instructor (CFI) 
recertification courses, interesting discussions arise among flight 
instructors over why general aviation is dying in this country. 
Product liability is usually the cause celebre named by most CFis. 
Lawyer CFis in attendance blame insurance companies. CFI insurance 
people blame lawyers. This writer points to a litigious society and 
any blame is well described by Walt Kelly's Pogo character. Pogo 
said, "We have met the enemy, and he is us." 
NASA Daniel Goldin, at the Experimental Aircraft Association's 
National Convention in Oshkosh, committed NASA to giving 
aeronautics the attention it deserves. He followed up with the 
establishment of a NASA Aeronautics Advisory Committee Task 
Force on General aviation Transportation (EAA, 1993, p. 10). General 
aviation was nearly dead at the end of the 1980s. But maybe like the 
movie alien E.T., it will revive. As a general aviation pilot, this biased 
writer has sincere hopes. 
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Stall/Spin Research. Langley's 20-Foot Vertical Spin Tunnel 
I is the only operational spin tunnel in the United States, and thet+e is 
only one more in the free world. It operates as a free spin tunnel, is 
powered by a 1,300 horsepower main drive and has a closed throat 
annular return. The 25-foot tall test section has 12 sides and is 20 
feet across. Tunnel speeds are variable from. 0 to 90 feet per second. 
Spin recovery characteristics are studied by remotely actuating the 
aerodynamic controls to predetermined positions. Its actuators, like 
spring loaded mouse traps, move immediately to the anti-spin 
position. Video or motion picture records are used to record the spin 
and recovery characteristics. 
For ten years, NASA Langley's Stall/Spin Research Program 
worked to improve the spin resistance of light aircraft. Stall/ spin 
accidents are a leading cause of fatal accidents for general aviation 
aircraft. The majority of these fatalities occur from an inadvertent 
stall and resultant "departure from controlled flight" (Stough, 1983, 
p. 15) at low altitude. In 1980 Langley researchers conducted a 
study to improve flight safety by predicting potential spin modes 
using on-line predictions with rotary-balance techniques. The 20 foot 
spin tunnel at NASA Langley was once the only way to measure "an 
airplane's aerodynamic characteristics in the rotational flow 
environment of a spin" (Chambers, 1980, p. 15). The rotary balance 
used with the mini-computer made it possible to measure 
aerodynamic forces and moments for a model over the expecteq 
range of variables in a spin and immediately predict spin modes. 
Having the instantaneous analysis greatly speeds up the process of 
determining "spin modes, recovery control effects, airframe 
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component effects, and parameter sensitivity studies" (Chambers, 
1980, p. 15). When used with the spin tunnel tests, a better 
understanding of an airplane's spin characteristics can be obtained. 
Spin Research Rocket System. In full-scale stall/spin studies 
in 1980, Langley developed a spin recovery system using hydrogen 
peroxide rockets mounted on the wing tips of light aircraft. The 
system, tested on a Beechcraft C-23X Sundowner, can retard the spin 
rate, thus providing recoveries from fully developed spins. It also 
can increase the spin rate and can generate spins at very high angles 
of attack. This allows the exposure of all possible spin modes of the 
aircraft. There may be spin modes encountered at higher angles of 
attack than those achievable with standard airplane controls. If there 
is a hidden spin mode, this system is capable of finding it (O'Bryan, 
1980, p. 18). 
All aircraft tested in the stall/spin program had exits on both 
the right and left fuselage sides except the prototype Piper Arrow 
N. In the event of a non-recoverable spin and the failure of the 
anti-spin parachute used for recovery, it might have been impossible 
for the research pilot to exit the airplane. So in 1981, Langley 
researchers designed an emergency egress system usable in any type 
of aircraft by allowing designers to create an opening anywhere on 
the fuselage of the aircraft. "The system is very stable and is 
activated by predetermined positive actions" (Bement, 1981, p. 23). 
The system works in the air or on the ground and improves chances 
for exiting the aircraft in an emergency. It can be used on any 
aircraft whether military, commercial, or general aviation. 
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The system, when activated, creates an opening and 
automatically ejects the structure. (It is not like an airliner 
emergency exit where someone must open the exit and then find 
some place to put the door.) The system was used on the NASA 
Langley prototype Piper Arrow IV in NASA's stall/spin test research 
program. 
The system, designed so it could be an add-on, cuts the aircraft 
skin and creates a square opening approximately 76 cm (30 in) on 
each side. An external frame outlines the area to be cut. The metal is 
cut using a very small amount of explosive. The needed quantity is 
less than 11 gm (0.4 oz). The system is actuated by a single pull of a 
handle (Bement, 1983, p. 24 ). 
The explosion cuts the skin around the window to the floor, and 
on the Piper Arrow, it also cuts the central stringer. The opening is 
"neat arid smooth" (Bement, 1983, p. 24 ). The explosive pressure 
wave hits the external frame jettisoning it. The panel is jettisoned at 
a speed of 13.7 m/sec. That is 45 ft/sec or about 30 mph. There is a 
protective internal structure to contain all by products of the 
explosion including pressure and sound. The explosive pressure 
expansion is within the 3.8 cm (LS in) depth of the Piper Arrow. A 
wire mesh keeps the pilot window from entering the cockpit. The 
add-on weight is less than 6.3 kg (14 lb.). 
NASA Langley says the explosive is completely insensitive to 
mechanical abuse, radio/radar transmissions, lightning, and static 
electricity. No maintenance is required, but the initiators should be 
replaced every five years. Safe to say of this system, if the pilot! 
i 
wants a door, there will be a door! 
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Discontinuous Wing Leading Edge. In 1983 Langley flight 
tested a sharp-discontinuous-wing leading edge that produced a 
large increase in the stall angle of attack of the outer wing. Thus, 
there is a significant improvement in aircraft spin resistance (Stough, 
1983, p. 15). NASA, industry, and FAA pilots flew one airplane with 
the discontinuous-leading edge and identified the need to define 
standards for departure resistance and spin resistance. Spin 
resistance, as later defined by NASA and reported in Aircraft Spin 
Resistance Criteria, AIAA Paper No. 87-2562-CP, was, in essence, 
that the airplane will not spin even after it has stalled ~nd that pro-
spin controls are held for seven seconds or until a 360° heading 
change is reached. The spin tests were conducted using a Grumman 
American Yankee low-wing two place aircraft and a Beechcraft Be-
23X Sundowner. Later tests used the prototype Piper Arrow N and 
Cessna C-172. 
The summation of increments in angle of attack, due to maximum 
pitch control input, center-of-gravity location, power effects, and 
dynamic effects have been quantified and correlated well with the 
spinning tendencies (Stough, 1983, p. 15). 
When Beechcraft added wing tip extensions with extra fuel 
i 
I 
tanks to their turbocharged A-36TC Bonanza model, it initially could 
not pass the FAA stall/ spin certification tests. Beech engineers 
developed "dual vortex generators," wedge shaped extensions on the 
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Bonanza wing leading edges that perform like the Langley 
discontinuous leading edge. A number of Beechcraft Bonanza models 
were later fitted with dual vortex generators to improve spin 
resistance. 
Stall/Spin Resistance Criteria. Langley researchers in 1986 
assisted the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) in 
the development of criteria for spin-resistant airplanes. Non-spin-
resistant airplanes develop rapid rolling and yawing motions near 
and beyond the stall. A spin-resistant airplane would respond to 
normal control inputs and resist these motions. The criteria were 
proposed to the FAA in an effort to change FAA's Federal 
Aeronautics Regulation Part 23 concerning stall/ spin criteria for the 
design of a light airplane. Additional data were provided by data 
from Langley tests of NASA's Beechcraft C-23X Sundowner, "a 
representative four-place, single engine light airplane" (Stough, 
1986a, p. 11 ). The NASA/GAMA spin-resistance criteria were 
proposed to the FAA in May of 1985. These criteria were proposed as 
an alternative to FAR Part 23 § 200 standards. 
The proposed criteria address these characteristics through 
assessment of lateral controllability during stalls, stall 
characteristics during uncoordinated flight, and overall 
controllability following sustained control abuse (attempted spin 
entries) (Stough, 1986b, p. 91). 
The Beechcraft C-23X Sundowner, when tested with the basic 
wing, failed twenty two percent of the stall criteria tests and sixty 
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seven percent of the spin entry tests. Using the drooped or 
discontinuous wing leading edge configuration, all tests were passed 
which showed the criteria are achievable. 
The discontinuous leading edge and spin resistance criteria 
were developed through a complementary program of wind tunnel 
model tests, radio controlled model tests, and full scale airplane tests. 
Wing leading edge modifications were "developed to improve 
high-angle-of-attack aerodynamic characteristics" (Stough, 1987., p. 
14), and for "improved lateral stability and enhanced spin resistance" 
(Stough, 1987, p. 14). The technology was applied to the Schweizer 
SA203 7 A surveillance aircraft for improved low speed 
controllability, the prototype Devore 2-place Sunbird, and the OMAC 
10-passenger Laser 300. 
The spin resistance criteria developed by NASA Langley and 
the General Aviation Manufacturers Association were accepted by 
the FAA for certification of the LASER 300 and Sunbird. At the 
request of NASA and the FAA, selected pilots were familiarized with 
spin-resistant characteristics using a NASA spin-resistant research 
airplane. 
Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELI) Reliability 
Emergency Locator Transmitters were mandated by the U~ S. 
Congress in 1970 with a deadline of 1974 (Likakis, 1986, p. 1). The 
serviceability and reliability history of EL Ts has been poor to dismal. 
EL Ts are supposed to activate if the airplane crashes. But they don't 
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activate when they should and they activate when they should not. A 
i 
• I 
NTSB report based on 1976 and 1977 reports stated ELTs worked as 
they should in only 10 percent of those accidents where they should 
have helped (Likakis, 1986, p. 2). Any FM safety seminar or Civil 
Air Patrol member will quote false alarm rates above 95 percent, but 
the FM, in Attention To ELT's Insurance to Life issued in June 1987, 
states that in the calendar year 1986, only 5,268 of 46,062 possible 
EL T_ signals in the 48 conterminous United States were actually 
distress signals. So only 88.6 percent of the ELT signals were false. 
Federal Aeronautics Regulation (FAR) 91::iii2 requires all U.S. 
registered civil airplanes, except turbojets, agricultural aircraft, 
helicopters, or trainers used exclusively within 50 miles of home 
base, and other airplanes used in scheduled operations under FAR 
121, other than charter, to be equipped with Emergency Locator 
Transmitters (ELT) (FAA, 1970, p.1). 
The emergency locator transmitters broadcast on the 
international distress frequencies 121.S megahertz (MHz) and 243.0 
MHz (Geeting & Woerner 1988 ). 
In 1980 Langley researchers tested EL Ts in full scale crash test 
aircraft and in a laboratory test apparatus that simulates crash · 
pulses. The ELT inertia switches, often called "g" switches, have· been 
found to be vibration sensitive. The EL T inertia switches resonant 
frequencies fall in a range from below SO Hertz (Hz) to about 290 Hz. 
This is also the range of frequencies for local structural vibrations 
known to exist in general aviation (GA) aircraft. It is little wonder 
then that the EL Ts tend to activate so easily in normal operations, 
but often do not activate in airplane crashes. 
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The frequency range of crash pulses is usually below 15 Hz. 
The NASA Langley study suggested a change in the frequency 
response characteristics of EL T inertia switches to make them 
sensitive to crash pulse frequencies. An experimental switch was 
built and tested with the correct resonant frequency response 
characteristics. The experimental switch was found to have desirable 
performance characteristics (Carden, 1980, pp. 16, 17). 
Ultrasonic Nondestructive Evaluation of 
Aluminum Alloys 
Aluminum alloys will fail under low level cyclic stress loads. 
An increase in the number of fatigue cycles increases the probability 
of failure. The fatigue life of aircraft and the term "aging aircraft" hit 
the headlines when an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 lost a large section 
of its upper fuselage over the Hawaiian Islands April 28, 1988. This 
accident led to the first-ever human factors program in maintenance 
(Foushee, 1989, p. 115). In the Langley study, nondestructive 
evaluation (NDE) techniques were used in this study, and the acoustic 
nonlinearity parameter g' was determined for fatigued and non-
fatigued samples of 2024 aluminum. The fatigued samples showed a 
100 percent increase in nonlinearity (Yost, 1988, p. 120). Thus, it 
would be possible to check for possible catastrophic fatigue during 
I 
normal maintenance inspections. 
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Turbine Disk Crack Detector 
On July 19, 1989, a United Airlines DC-10, on a flight from 
Denver to Chicago, was flying over Iowa when it experienced turbine 
disk failure. Turbine parts flying about severed hydraulic lines 
causing the loss of control to the tail surfaces. The crew almost made 
a landing at Sioux City, Iowa. There were 107 deaths. 
Six years earlier in 1983, Lewis researchers developed a 
turbine disk crack detection system that consisted of: 
an eddy current sensor, and its cables within the engine, external 
connecting cables, and a remotely located electrical bridge and 
signal analyzer. As the turbine spins the rotor is monitored by the 
sensor for radial surface cracks emanating from the interblade 
region of the engine. (Barrenger, 1983, p. 9) 
The sensor was placed 2.5 mm (3/32 in) from the downwind 
side of the first stage turbine disk. The first turbine stage is where 
cracks tend to occur. The system was tested on a small military 
engine that had a turbine disk with service-induced cracks. At : 
ground idle the system detected cracks as short as 3 mm (1/8 in). 
The system performed well when operated in all normal engine 
operating regimes for over 25 hours, including 35 starts and stops. 
This writer has to wonder, what if? 
The People - Human Factors 
"Oh no, it wasn't the aeroplanes. It was Beauty killed the Beast" 
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I 
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I 
(Creelman & Rose, 1933). Really, it wasn't Beauty, either. To 
paraphrase the familiar National Rifle Association refrain: airpl~nes 
don't kill people; people kill people. For the 10 years 1974-1983, 
68.8 percent of all air transport accidents had the cockpit crew listed 
as the probable cause (Nagel, 1988, p. 265). As bad as that seems, 
commuter and general aviation statistici are more alarming. Pilot 
error has been identified as a contributing factor in 79 percent of 
commuter airline fatal accidents and in 88 percent of general 
aviation accidents. (Ott, 1988, p. 127) As might be expected, machine 
causes of aircraft accidents have decreased with availability of better 
systems, powerplants and navigation aids. But strange as it might 
seem with such improvements making airplanes easier to fly, human 
error is increasing as the cause of accidents. Billings and Reynard, as 
quoted by Nagel, called the human problem the last great frontier in 
aeronautics safety (Nagel, 1988, p. 266 ). 
Man-VehicJe Systems Research Facility 
The Ames Research Center Man-Vehicle Systems Research 
Facility (MVSRF) is a unique national research tool with the objective 
of studying basic human-factors issues related to human errors; in 
the national aeronautics system. The MVSRF has two full-mission 
flight simulators. One is a Boeing 727-200 simulator, and the other is 
the Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator. Both simulators can work 
independently or interactively in the same airspace, using a 
simulated Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. Air-to-ground, multi-
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aircraft, and full-mission scenarios can be flown with the capability 
to study man-to-man or man-to-machine interactions. 
The facility is used to conduct human-factors research on: 
1. Development of fundamental analytical expressions of the 
functional performance characteristics of aircraft crews. 
2. Formulation of design criteria and principles for environments 
of the future. 
3, Integration of new subsystems into contemporary flight and air 
traffic control scenarios. 
4. Creation of new training technologies that will be required by 
the continued technical evolution of flight systems and the 
operational environment ( Styles, 1984, p. 6 7). 
During the decade of the 80s, the MVSRF studied such 
problems as cockpit coordination and communications, later called 
resource management (CRM), automation, and the use of simulators 
in pilot training. 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a continuing 
program to improve safety by analysis of reports from pilots, air 
traffic controllers and others involved in aeronautics incidents. ASRS 
is concerned primarily with the quality of human performance :in the 
aeronautics system. ASRS serves the aeronautics community, the 
Federal Aeronautics Administration, and the Department of Defense 
by providing a central focus for collecting, analyzing, and 
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disseminating safety information derived from confidential reports 
I 
of incidents and situations in the national system (Reynard, 1981, p. 
34). 
The ASRS program is unique among aeronautics reporting systems. 
Its special qualities include the following: 
1. proof of the concept of acquisition, analysis, and use of inddent 
data, 
2. unique methodology to capture otherwise inaccessible human 
performance data, 
3. one-of-a-kind data base of actual incident information as 
reported by participants, 
4. proven capability for diverse application to both research and 
operations, 
5. ability to actively monitor the aeronautics system, 
6. capability of effective technology transfer as evidenced by ASRS-
type systems in other countries and disciplines, 
7. the world's largest repository of human performance 
information, 
8. consistent support and use of the program by government ~nd 
industry (Reynard, 1988, p. 56). 
The ASRS has operated under a memorandum of agreement 
with the Federal Aeronautics Administration since 1975. 
i 
The ASRS is funded by both the FAA and NASA, but the ~ AA 
has no direct role in the program's management. ASRS is managed by 
I 
I 
the Life Sciences Directorate at Ames and functions as a part of the 
human factors research in the aeronautics environment. ASRS 
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reports have led to changes in operational procedures. The "sterile 
cockpit" concept in air carrier operations is an example. 
Incident reporting has proven to be a logical and effective 
supplement to established accident investigation procedures and 
other system monitoring techniques. Whereas incidents occur with 
predictable regularity, and always leave the participants in a 
position to help investigators if they so choose, accidents often 
preclude post-event interaction with the flight crew members 
(Reynard, 1983, p. 32). 
What makes ASRS work is its confidential, nonpunitive, and 
voluntary nature. The data is unique and often is an honest self-
appraisal. Issue-specific data are available to NASA, the NTSB, the 
FAA, and anyone else interested in aeronautics safety. What is not 
available is information about the person making the report. 
By providing a report of an incident or an unsafe condition, the 
person filing the report is, for the most part, immune from any 
disciplinary action under Federal Aeronautics Regulations ( 14 CFR § 
91.57). The filing of an ASRS report is "indicative of a constructive 
attitude" (FAA AC No. 00-46C, § 9. c). For this reason, when this 
writer instructs at Certificated Flight Instructor Courses for the Texas 
Department of Aeronautics, ASRS reports are referred to as "CYA" 
paper. 
The ASRS reports are also used to report hazardous conditions. 
This writer knows of two instances where ASRS reports have had an 
effect. In Cincinnati, OH Lunken Airport had some taxiway markings 
which were worn away, and some local pilots believed visiting pilots 
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unfamiliar with the airport could inadvertently taxi onto an acdve 
runway. ASRS analysts wrote to the airport manager, and the i 
I 
markings were repainted (Lunken pilots, January 19, 1992). Patrick 
' 
Shaub, Texas Department of Aeronautics, said in a personal 
communication that the Austin, TX airport control tower radar would 
not show the emergency transponder code 7700. That code is 
supposed to trigger an alert if an aircraft has an emergency. Several 
calls to the FAA facility had no effect, but after an ASRS report, the 
situation was resolved. 
CALLBACK, a monthly publication distributed to the 
aeronautics community, is a brief, readable means of sharing 
important safety data. CALLBACK summarizes some ASRS reports 
and includes interesting safety tips for pilots and air crews. In a 
special 1991 Fall edition of CALLBACK, the headline read: "The · 
Bottom line: ASRS works." 
Emergency Medical Service Safety Network 
The mid-80s saw a high accident rate for EMS helicopter • 
operators. It was estimated that 80 percent of the accidents were 
pilot error. To identify the primary causes of those accidents, an EMS 
I 
Safety Network was established with the NASA ASRS being the i 
' 
primary and secondary repository for EMS accident and incidertt 
information (Hart, 1987, p. 45). 
An in-flight evaluation of EMS flight crews was completed in 
I 
1989. The field study investigated pilot workload, pilot decisiotj 
1 
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making, cues for geographical orientation, and communications. EMS 
pilots gave missions to accident scenes the highest workload ratings, 
and hospital transfers the lowest. Outbound legs were given higher 
workload ratings (Battiste, 1989, p. 51 ). 
A preflight risk assessment procedure called SAFE, similar to 
those used by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Coast Guard, was tested by 
EMS pilots, hospital personnel , or administrators. For geographical 
orientation EMS pilots used more cultural and natural features such 
as lakes, bridges, and cities or mountain peaks than linear features 
like roads and rivers. Compared to four non-EMS pilots who 
depended on charts, the EMS pilots relied more on memory. EMS 
pilots navigate by pilotage and radio navigation while the other 
pilots also use dead reckoning. Both groups estimated spending more 
than half (58 percent) of their time on flying, about 25 percent 
navigating, 15 percent in geographical orientation and 3 percent 
communicating (Battiste, 1989, p. 52). 
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) 
CRM refers to a broad array of factors associated with effective team 
performance such as communication, interactional styles, 
leadership and related characteristics (Foushee, 1989, p. 38). 
Many accidents occur when perfectly good aircraft crash, and 
people die because well-trained air crews fail to perform as well-
trained air crews. Three accidents come to mind. An Eastern Airlines 
Lockheed L-1011 crashed near Miami in 1972 because the ere~ quit 
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flying the aircraft after becoming distracted by a failed indicator 
light. A United Airlines DC-8 crashed after running out of fuel near 
Portland, OR in 1978, again after the air crew became distracted by a 
failed indicator light. Finally, and possibly the worst case of a crew 
not flying the aircraft occurred June 26, 1988 near Habsheim, France 
during a low fly-by at an airshow. The crew of a new Airbus A320, 
pilot Michel Assetine and co-pilot Pierre Maxieres flying manually, 
managed to defeat all the A320s ultrasafe systems (Gunston, 1992, p. 
829). Rescuers recovered four bodies and 30 injured. 
Crew Coordination and Communications 
Ames researchers identified the extent of air 
crew coordination problems in the 1970s. NASA took the lead in 
encouraging and assisting airlines in developing programs that 
influence air crew performance. An early NASA research program in 
the CRM area was a flight crew coordination study at Ames in 1981. 
Its objective was to identify and propose solutions to cockpit 
coordination and communication problems. 
The lack of crew coordination and communications has led to 
many more aircraft accidents than those listed above. This study was 
conducted using full-mission simulations. The cockpit voice 
recordings were analyzed and in-flight errors were recorded. A 
relationship was found between communication patterns and 
performance. In general, crews that communicated less made more 
errors. As a result of this study, the NTSB recommended that the 
FM take steps to ensure adequate flight crew communications _ 
(Lauber, 1981, p. 34). 
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Another result of the study was to conclude full mission 
simulation can be beneficial to flight training. Line Oriented Flight 
Training (LOFT) or a simulation of a complete flight better shows 
crew coordination problems. As a result, the FM changed its 
regulations to promote more widespread use of LOFT for training in 
crew coordination and resource management (Lauber, 1981, p. 34 ). 
The military version of LOFT is MOST, or mission-oriented flight 
training. 
In 1982 Ames continued its crew .coordination and 
communication study. The NTSB had observed that in some accident 
cases subordinate crew members were aware of potential problems 
but were not assertive enough to the pilot in command Full missions 
of Boeing 7 4 7 flights from New York to London were simulated. The 
cockpit voice recordings were content-coded for all categories of 
communication. The full-mission simulation included all aspects of 
the actual flight. Visual and motion cues, air traffic control, and 
weather were realistically duplicated (Foushee, 1982, p. 18). Various 
simulated malfunctions were used to increase crew workload. 
Substantial differences showed up in crew performance related 
to communication and coordination. The best performing crews 
showed more cohesion and a higher frequency of acknowledgment 
for the input of others. A free exchange of information led to better 
performance. The "management style" of the captain strongly 
affected the communication process (Foushee, 1982, p. 18). 
Traditionally, the captain of an aircraft is king, be it dictator or 
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despot, benevolent or not. Assertiveness training was included with 
CRM training by some airlines as a result of these studies. This writer 
' knows of one incident where a copilot pointed out to her captain that 
an action he had taken was illegal and possibly dangerous. She was 
fired by the airline the next day. 
By the late 1980s, CRM was accepted by all U.S. air carriers and 
incorporated into their training programs. Those studies led to 
development of CRM training programs and techniques like Line-
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). The U.S. Air Force was the first to 
accept the need for CRM, and Delta Airlines was the last of the 
airlines to incorporate CRM training. An Ames study in 1988, funded 
by the FM and conducted by the University of Texas, evaluated the 
effectiveness of Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training 
programs. Data was collected from multiple organizations on key 
crew coordination dimensions related to performance and overall 
safety. The data was collected before, during, and for a period of 
years after training. The Aeronautics Safety Reporting System and 
other incident data bases provided by all participating organizations 
provided long-term trends (Foushee, 1988, p. 38 ). 
Fatigue and Circadian Rhythmicity 
In the mid 1980s, Ames research Center undertook several 
studies to "document the psychological and physiological impact of 
fatigue and circadian factors on short-haul and international long-
haul trips" (Lauber, 1985, p. 31 ). This research was mandated by 
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Congress in 1982. Fatigue has often been cited as a contributing 
cause of aircraft accidents. Previous studies had been of little use 
because of the difficulty of generalizing laboratory performance and 
the fact that there were few controlled studies on fatigue. This study 
examined the performance of 20 crews, 10 rested and 10 just coming 
off a three-day high density short-haul duty cycle. 
The results were as expected in that the post duty crews were 
significantly more fatigued than the rested crews. But unexpectedly, 
it was found that the fatigued crews performed significantly better 
than the rested pre-duty crews. The post-duty crews flew more 
stabilized approaches, made fewer operational errors, and 
communicated more. Suggested reasons were that the post-duty 
crews had more crew coordination due to the recent time working 
together (Foushee & Lauber, 1985, p. 31). 
In a companion study, researchers continuously monitored air 
crew's heart rate, temperature, and limb activity before, during, and 
after flying line trips. The short-haul study included 91 crew 
members from two airlines on 46 trips that included 821 flights. 
Researchers looked for sleep decrement, increase in subjective 
fatigue, mood shifts, and changes in sleep/ activity and temperature 
rhythms. The long-haul trip selection was based on flights per day, 
layover and trip length, as well as unusual flight times, high 
workload operations, and multiple time-zone crossings. The 
physiological record was keyed to time-linked cockpit observer logs 
of operational events. Background information on lifestyle and 
personality was combined with information from daily log books in 
which each pilot's sleep, activities, diet, and mood were recorded. The 
long-haul study consisted of four crews on six or seven 
representative trips in eastward, westward, and north-south 
directions (Lauber, 1985, p. 31 ). 
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The study continued into 1986 and NASA's circadian 
rhythmicity studies were more extensive than ever undertaken 
before. As a result, NASA was asked to assist in the development of 
certification criteria for advanced long-haul aircraft (Graeber & 
Foushee, 1987, p. 44). 
By 1988, to better understand how and why pilot performance 
can be degraded, studies of limited laboratory and simulator 
research were combined with extensive field studies to objectively 
study the physiological and behavioral responses of flight crews 
operating different flight environments. This program was conducted 
in cooperation with research organizations and airlines in West 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The impacts of fatigue and 
circadian rhythmicity on flight crew performance of both military 
and commercial crews were studied. Reasons for the study were the 
reduction in air crew size and the introduction of highly automated 
aircraft. Three planned improvements to flight safety were: 
• development of guidelines for rule making and 
certification, 
• design of individual coping strategies, 
• and operational recommendations to air carriers. 
The types of flight operations studied were: 
• B-747 and C-141 operations in multisegment 
international long-haul patterns (Pan Am , British 
Airways, and USAF), 
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• B-727 overnight cargo delivery·(Federal Express), 
• and extended range North Sea helicopter transport With 
four rotorcraft types (British Airways). 
This was augmented with electroencephalography (EEG) sleep 
data on layovers from flight operations on eastward and westward 
polar routes through Anchorage. 
Technology transfer to the industry is occurring through 
interaction with the FAA aircraft certification teams, two U.S. Pacific 
carriers, and the development with a U.S. manufacturer of a crew 
alertness support device for long-haul glass cockpits (Graeber, 1988, 
pp. 41, 42). 
Cockpit Rest Periods 
The FAA, unions, and two aircraft manufacturers then 
approved a study of preplanned cockpit napping. An AP report from 
London, in the Daily Oklahoman January 20, 1989, quoted Dr. Jeffery 
Bennett, the chief medical officer of the British Civil Aeronautics 
Authority, as saying, "If asked, any long haul pilot of 20 years 
experience will say that at some stage he will have woken up and 
found the whole crew asleep" ("Airline Crews," 1989, p. 2). 
The Dallas Morning News December, 28, 1992 included a i 
Washington Post article reporting the FAA had developed a plail 
called "controlled rest" to one crew member at a time to take a nap. 
This came about as a result of NASA crew factors study. The Allied 
Pilots Association, which is American Airlines pilot's union, criticized 
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the plan as it could lead to longer duty times for pilots ("Study finds," 
1992, p. 4A). 
Boredom Detection 
In 1989 Langley Research Center conducted a related study to 
develop physiological measures that could be useful in boredom 
detection. The method used was to detect the pilot's mental states, 
which are predictive of performance degradation, and then intervene 
to restore acceptable performance. 
Boredom is not a problem in high task load situations like. 
takeoff and landing. This study simulated conditions characterized by 
"simple repetitive responses with minimal novelty, complexity, and 
uncertainty" (Comstock, Harris & Pope, 1989, p. 89). An 
Electrocardiogram (EKG), an electroencephalogram (EEG), and pupil 
diameter (PD) were used to measure mental state of the test subjects. 
The task was to monitor an engine fault pictorial with several 
possible faults. Subjects were to acknowledge the fault with miuimal 
response time. 
Physiological measures of the 11 test subjects were monitored 
over one hour test sessions. "Heart rate variability (HRV), alpha 
variance (EEG component), and PD each exhibited changes indicative 
of decrements in subject arousal level" (Comstock, Harris & Pop~, 
I 
1989, p. 90). 
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Computational Models of Attention and Cognition 
In the opposite vein, where information comes too quickly or 
from too many resources, humans are limited in their ability to · 
process and respond to multiple information sources. Thus, Ames had 
an ongoing program to develop and validate computational models of 
human information processing. 
Aeronautics and space environments impose severe visual, auditory, 
and decision-making demands in situations where human failure 
can cause catastrophic results. Information overload has been • 
identified as a major contributor to error in military aeronautics, 
and in critical monitoring tasks such air traffic control 
(Remington, 1988, p. 54). 
The solution to human limitations in attention and cognitive 
capabilities requires an optimal allocation of function between man 
and machine and optimal configuration of multimodal displays and 
controls. Researchers identified stimuli that control attention and 
situations in which distraction was unavoidable. Computational , 
models of human information processing were developed 
(Remington, 1988, p. 54 ). 
Attention and cognitive capacities were investigated as a basis 
of analysis and model development in the following areas: 
• ground control of manned and unmanned space 
operations, 
• helicopter nap-of-the-Earth (NOE) and search and rescue 
operations, 
• and air traffic control and anticipated Space Station ' 
proximity control operations. 
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Also studied were the related areas of collision avoidance,. pilot 
workload, pilot alertness, and pilot error (Remington, 1988, p. 54). 
Since the era of advanced aircraft ·controls and instrumentation was 
common in the late 1980s, Ames studied human factors in these 
advanced transports. 
Effect of DigitaJ AJtimetry on Pi1ot Work.Joad 
In 1984 Langley researchers conducted a program to 
determine the placement and type of display to reduce altimetry 
errors. One of the most common errors in flying is missing an altitude 
assignment. All air carrier aircraft and many general aviation aircraft 
have at least two altimeters, and all air carrier aircraft have at least 
two crew members. Using different types of display devices and 
microprocessors, a general effort was made to determine the effects 
different types and information placement had on pilot scanning 
behavior and workload. 
The NASA Langley fixed-base Full-Workload Simulator was 
used for the evaluation. Seventy two VOR-DME (VHF omni 
range/Distance Measuring Equipment) approaches were flown. The 
scanning behavior and workload of using the counter-drum-pointer 
I 
altimeter (COPA) and the digital· altimeter were compared. Six pilots 
used both the COPA and the DA. Data taken by using the Langley 
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oculometer system ". ; was reduced to dwell percentages, average 
dwell times, transition matrixes, and dwell time histograms" 
(Harris, 1984, p. 30). 
The results showed little difference in the use of either 
altimeter. The research pilots were generally negative toward the 
digital altimeter due to a lack of needle motion cues. The research 
pilots took longer to form a mental picture of altitude using the 
digital altimeter. There was also more mental arithmetic required to 
estimate the difference in altitude and assigned altitude. Dr. Cecil 
Dugger of the Aeronautics and Space Education Department of 
Oklahoma State University, in a personal communication in February, 
1993, pointed out the same problem in using digital watches. More 
mental arithmetic and the necessity of forming a mental picture are 
necessary in using a digital watch unless only the absolute time is 
needed. Analog watches give a mental picture of a time period as 
well as the time. Analog altimeters indicate an altitude in a range of 
altitudes. Near an assigned altitude or near the ground, the pilot sees 
where he is, where he is headed, and where he needs to be. Digital 
display of altitude does require more cognitive processes of the pilot 
than conventional altimeter display (Harris, 1984, p. 30). 
Advanced Technology Transport Problems 
' 
Often problems and benefits of new technology emerge or).ly 
after extensive pilot experience in actual operations. Two airlines and 
more than 200 pilots participated in this 1989 study. The principal 
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investigator, Earl Wiener of the University of Miami, attended ground 
school and made observation flights from the jump seat. 
The results show pilots were generally positive but had 
reservations about safety. Some of the concerns were: 
• Pilots believed automation reduces workload in routine 
operations but workload was increased if the Flight 
Management System was reprogrammed. 
• Pilots were concerned about too much head-in-the-
cockpit time. 
• Pilots were concerned about degradation of manual flying 
skills and took active measures to avoid it. 
• Pilots believed that crew coordination was especially 
necessary in advanced transports. 
• Pilots were concerned that air traffic control did not take 
advantage of the advanced navigation and guidance 
capabilities of the new systems. 
• Pilots felt that cockpit automation changed traditional 
role definitions like pilot flying versus pilot not flying. 
• Pilots complained about a lack of clarity of who does 
what. 
• Pilots felt that supervision was more difficult or at least 
different. 
• Pilots often performed tasks assigned to the other pilot, 
' 
such as the first officer sometimes was more proficient 
than the captain in the new displays. 
A full-mission study was conducted to further investigate. the 
interaction of cockpit automation and crew coordination. 
117 
Automation 
Microprocessor technology made it possible to highly automate 
aircraft cockpits, and several technical, economic, and safety benefits 
of automation should have been evident. It did not always work out 
that way. Automation is often thought of as synonymous with 
dehumanization. Images of HAL in the movie 2001 or robots come to 
mind. Wiener, in Human factors in Aeronautics, states that 
automation "generally means replacing human functioning with 
machine functioning" (Wiener, 1988. p. 436 ). Wiener also states that 
a considerable amount of time during the early NASA Ames studies 
on cockpit automation was expended in defining the term. Wiener's 
definition is that "some tasks or portions of tasks performed by the 
human crew can be assigned, by the choice of the crew, to 
machinery." (Wiener, 1988, p. 436) Ames researchers conducted 
several studies on cockpit automation from 1985 through 1989 to 
evaluate cockpit automation to determine desirable and undesirable 
characteristics and features. 
Williams, in From Sails to Satellites, states: 
If, some day, the human pilot is removed from the airline flight-
deck, it will not be to economize on his salary, but for fear that he 
' 
might touch something. There are already airliners with flying 
control systems which override the commands the pilot gives to the 
system by the forces he exercises on the controls when the machine 
I 
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thinks fit - a premonitory view of the monitor monitored (Williams, 
' 
1992, p. 163). 
Williams also made another point on automation. Writing about 
navigators, he stated: 
Human navigators have always made mistakes; but experienced ones 
seem to have some kind of feedback system in their heads which 
often enables them to sense when something is wrong. Machines 
have no equivalent sense, and as men become more remote from the 
navigation they lose theirs. The magnitude of the blunder at the 
interface is virtually unlimited (Williams, 1992, p. 173). 
One can replace the term "navigator'' with "pilot" or with almost 
any other term, and the idea still holds. 
Field Studies and Guidelines. Studies were conducted during 
early line operations of the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 and the Boeing 
767. The investigation covered all facets of operations from ground 
school to line operations. Researchers used questionnaires, rating 
scales, and interviews. Four airlines participated in the study and the 
results found wide acceptance of the new cockpit technology. Sqme 
specific features were more popular than others, and like a VCR, 
some features were not understood by the pilots. Thus, there was 
room for improvement. With the new systems came new 
' 
requirements for training, and there was the potential for skill toss if 
i 
automation left less for pilots to do in the cockpit. Automation did 
not eliminate pilot error, and in some cases the automated cockpit 
systems lead to different errors (Lauber, 1985, p. 31). 
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Error Detection. Several factors increased the need for more 
precise navigation and control. Along with automation changing the 
traditional role of pilots, there was greater traffic volume and no 
increase in airport capacity. In 1986 Ames Research Center studied 
the effects of cockpit automation on human error, workload, and the 
need for improved performance. Pilot attitude toward automation 
and their usage patterns were augmented by studies of the 
Aeronautics Safety Reporting System data base. 
The goal was to develop computerized systems to detect errors 
and either warn the pilot or take autonomous corrective action. Ames 
also contracted studies for the use of artificial intelligence in crew 
error detection. For automation to be an asset instead of a liability it 
must insure maximum compatibility with human pilot capabilities 
and limitations (Palmer, 1986, pp. 31, 32). 
Ames researchers developed a computer program to track crew 
activity and detect pilot errors. Aeronautics Safety Reporting System 
data indicated that human error accounted for more than 7 5 percent 
of all accidents. Ames researchers believed that properly designed 
forms of automation could reduce the impact of human error in 
aeronautics operations. It would be necessary to understand crew 
errors and understand crew actions for an error-tolerant cockpit to 
become a reality. A script knowledge-based program for a Boeing 
I 
727 tracked crew activity and detected crew errors. An extension of 
! 
the program predicted consequences of detected errors, and a related 
study found the application of flight path control was feasible 
(Palmer, 198 7, p. 51 ). 
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Error-Tolerant Systems, A necessary component of an ep-or-
tolerant system was a pilot model to track pilot actions, infer pilot 
intent, detect unexpected actions, and alert the crew to potential 
errors. Thus, pilots would always be riding with a check pilot, an 
electronic one. The study pursued· three alternative ways to track 
operator activity. They were: 
• A rule-based script of flight phases and procedural 
actions, 
• operator function models, 
• and Bayesian temporal models (Palmer, 1988, p. 51). 
The script based program could detect procedural errors but 
could not adequately account for procedures that were not normal. A 
capability to link unexpected actions to normal actions was added. 
Georgia Tech developed an intent-inferencing system based on an 
operator function model that was tested on data from a satellite 
communications system. Search technology developed a prototype 
for an in.tent-inferencing system based on Bayesian reasoning. Three 
models were tested against the B-727 simulator. And the technology 
developed was used to develop an interactive procedures cockph 
display (Palmer, 1988, p. S 1 ). 
As a follow up to previous research, in 1989, Ames researchers 
I 
planned to initiate an experiment to determine how check pilot~ 
I 
detect procedural errors and infer pilot intent. The researchers tilso 
I 
' 
planned to develop a "smart checklist" that would track pilot actions 
! 
and include both passively monitored pilot's executions of i 
procedures and automatic executing procedures (Palmer, 1989,: 
p. 74). 
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Ames Research Center, under a Small Business Innovation' 
Research contract, planned to "develop and test a procedure 
execution aid that can compose procedures that are appropriate for 
the current flight situation and equipment configuration" (Palmer, 
1989, p. 75). As a result of this research, Ames researchers planned 
to develop full-mission simulations for a cockpit procedures monitor 
and smart checklist in the Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator of the 
Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility. 
Advisory System for Conflict Detection & 
Resolution for Air Traffic Control 
Ames Research Center developed a system in 1988 for air· 
traffic controllers to detect and resolve a potential conflict between 
aircraft in the terminal environment. The system used four 
dimensional ( 4-D) guidance to accurately predict potential conflicts 
even when the aircraft are flying complex trajectories. A hierarchy of 
resolution techniques were "derived from an extensive interview of a 
controller expert" (Lee, 1988, p. 85 ). 
Using calculated 4-D trajectories based on 4-D guidance 
algorithms for all aircraft from the present to a look-ahead time that 
is usually 10 minutes, the system generated aircraft trajectories! and 
i potential conflict pairs stored in a global conflict-detection matr~x. 
The pairs with the shortest conflict time were resolved first by · 
altering speed, altitude, or heading. The result was a sequence ~f 
time-ordered guidance commands. After the potential conflict Jas 
' i 
resolved, the aircraft maneuvers to the original flight path (Lee, 
1988, p. 85). 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
A total of 83 NASA aeronautics safety programs was identified 
during the years 1980 through 1989. The research was accomplished 
for the most part by researchers from NASA Langley Research Center 
in Hampton, VA; NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, OH; and 
the NASA Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA. In addition, 
various contractors, universities, and, in some cases, military 
personnel and installations were involved. 
The research programs were analyzed using four methods in an 
attempt to compare and contrast the research from the three NASA 
centers involved with aeronautics safety. The four methods were as 
follows: 
• listing the various programs without repetition of 
continuing programs, found in APPENDIX A, as per 
objective 1, 
• listing the programs classified by category, 
found in APPENDIX B, as per objective 2, 
• listing the programs compared by year, found in 
APPENDIX C, as per objective 3, 
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I 
• and listing the programs compared by applicability to all 
aviation, air transport operations, or general aviation 
operations found in APPENDIX D, as per objective 6. • 
In total, Ames Research Center conducted 27 aeronautics safety 
research programs during the 80s. Several were multi-year 
programs such as the individual crew factors program. The 
Aeronautics Safety Reporting System (ASRS) had been operating for 
five years before the decade started and is still operating in April 
1993. Ames conducted two weather related programs, seven aircraft 
related programs, and 16 human factors programs. 
Langley Research Center researchers conducted by far the most 
aeronautics research programs. The 43 Langley programs were more 
than those of Ames and Lewis combined. Langley conducted 12 
programs on weather and wake vortex problems, 27 programs 
related to machine or aircraft, and five programs dealing with human 
factors. 
Lewis Research Center in Cleveland was involved in the fewest 
programs with 13 programs including 11 related to icing. The other 
two dealt with powerplant research .. 
Summary by Objectives 
Objective 1: To identify NASA aeronautics safety programs for tp.e 
years 1980 through 1989 (Appendix A). 
The NASA aeronautics safety research programs of the period 1980-
1989 were as follows: 
NASA Aeronautics Safety Research Programs 1980-1989 
The Environment, weather and turbulence 
Heavy Rain 
Micro bursts/Windshear 
Clear Air Turbulence 
Storm Hazards/Lightning 
Sacrificial Lightning Rods 
Wake Vortices 
The Machine, the aircraft 
Langley 20 Foot Vertical Tunnel 
Lewis Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) 
Icing Detection Systems 
Ground Anti-Icing/deicing Fluids (Types I and II) 
Icing Effects on Stability and Control 
Icing Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) 
Deicing Systems 
Control Systems 
Advanced Instrumentation 
Crashworthy Structures Research 
Fireworthy Structures Research 
Controlled Impact Demonstration 
General aviation Stall/Spin Research 
Emergency Locator Transmitter Reliability 
Aging Aircraft, NDE Aluminum Structures 
The People, Human Factors 
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Ames Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility (MVSRF) 
Aeronautics Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) 
Crew Coordination and Communications 
Fatigue and Circadian Factors (Jet-Lag) 
"Controlled Rest" 
Automation 
Error/Fault-Tolerant Systems 
Emergency Medical Service Safety Problems 
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Advisory Conflict Detection and Resolution for Air Traffic 
Control 
Objective 2: To classify research programs broadly into three 
elements (Appendix B). 
• the Environment - the air, the medium in which all 
aircraft fly, including weather and aircraft induced 
turbulence; 
• the Machine - the aircraft, electrical or mechanical 
systems, its airframe, engines, instrumentation; 
• and the people, including everything integrating the 
humans with the machines they fly. 
Objective 3: To trace the development of NASA Aeronautics Safety 
Research Programs by comparing programs for the years 1980 
through 1989 (Appendix C). 
Appendix C lists the programs reported in the yearly Res~arch 
I 
and Technology publications. Note that continuing programs we~e not 
always reported each year. 
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Objective 4: To summarize each research program. 
Chapter III contains the summaries of all programs identified 
for the years 1980-1989. 
Objective 5: To determine if NASA aeronautics safety research 
programs have increased in numbers and scope over the years 1980 
through 1989. 
Objective 5 was harder to attain than thought at the beginning 
of the research. For that matter, a valid comparison is impossible, 
due to the diversity of programs and lack of prioritization. 
Comparison of aviation safety programs is truly an "apples and 
oranges" situation. A look at Appendix C shows that the totals show 
more identified programs in 1989 than in 1980. But the 17 programs 
for 1989, compared to 13 for 1980, really do not show an increasing 
commitment by NASA in aviation safety. Safety programs come and 
go with seemingly little long range planning, direction, or 
coordination. 
Objective 6: To compare each program by applicability 
(Appendix D) . 
. A comparison of aviation safety research programs by 
applicability to all areas of civil aviation, air transport operations, 
and general aviation indicates that all areas were included. There 
were fewer general aviation programs, but the general aviation i 
I 
I 
program ended early in the decade. The total numbers for the ' 
programs were 27 programs applicable to all civil aviation, 35 
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applicable to air transport operations, and 27 applicable to general 
! 
aviation safety research. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
NASA and Aeronautics Safety Research 
NASA accomplished much in the area of aeronautics safety in 
the decade of the 1980s, and by almost any measure, aeronautics 
was a safer activity at the end of the decade than the beginning. But 
how much safer, because of NASA aeronautics safety research, is 
arguable. Surely more is known now about microbursts, windshear, 
and clear air turbulence. More is known about how to build 
. fireworthy and crashworthy aircraft structures. Automation has 
made aircraft operation navigation incredibly easy, but now NASA is 
developing error tolerant systems and fault-tolerant controls. 
At NASA, there is a noticeable trend toward total automation, 
' 
with little or no pilot/air crew input or control. The research using 
the advanced pilot work stations at Ames and Langley Research 
Centers, for the most part, have the pilot as a systems monitor only. 
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There is a Catch 2 2 with automation. Automation should give the 
pilot more time to become alert to what is happening, but when the 
pilot does or does not do something in an automated environment, 
often a blunder results. 
As stated earlier, when humans and machines are interfaced 
and humans are removed from the information loop and control, 
they usually do not notice problems. But if they do, they do not 
understand how to resolve the problems. Humans also begin to 
commit blunders when removed from the information loop. The 
more experienced humans sometimes notice problems faster and 
with better understanding. In the future when all aircraft are 
automated, when and where are pilots going to attain the experience 
to sense when something is wrong or to know what to do if there is a 
problem? 
There is a joke that in the future the total crew of an airliner 
will be a "pilot" and a dog. The· pilot will be there to feed the dog, and 
the dog will be there to bite the pilot if he touches anything. The 
attempt to make aircraft/machines idiot proof has not achieved its 
objective. The Airbus A320 crash at Habsheim in 1988 and an 
Airforce B-1B crash in West Texas in 1992, where the crew turned 
off the terrain-following radar only seconds before the aircraft flew 
into the side of a mountain, are horrible but good examples. 
This writer found no research enhancing the human role in 
aeronautics safety. What was noticed was a resigned belief that pilots 
are going to make mistakes, so the trend appears merely to give 
them less to do and provide systems that safely tolerate the 
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blunders. This may stem from the way pilots are trained from the 
beginning. 
Pilot training is not training in how to think. Pilots are trained 
to perform a set of operations whether in normal operations or 
emergency conditions. All operations are devoid of human thought. 
This type training is to assure quick reaction. Surely, if you are flying 
a light twin engined airplane and you lose an engine just after 
takeoff, you are going to crash if you do not quickly clean up the 
airplane by raising the landing gear and flaps. But you cannot just 
react. You must still fly the airplane while thinking, not merely 
reacting. Clear thought and keen pilot attention to the situation, 
whether it is normal operations or an emergency situation, is 
essential. The only situation this writer can think of where the pilot 
must be out of the information/ control loop is in a zero ceiling and 
zero visibility automatic landing situation. There would be no time 
for the pilot to react or to act positively if something goes wrong 
close to the ground. Of course, that situation leads to an interesting 
question. If the human pilot is useless in the worst piloting scenario, 
why have a human pilot anyway? 
NASA as an Aeronautics Advocate 
One could conclude that NASA has always been on the cutting 
edge of technology, but often that is not the case, though not always 
NASA's fault. NASA's role is R & T, Research and Technology - - not R 
& D, Research and Development. Any development is the decision of 
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industry. For example, ice detection system technology identified and 
studied by NASA in the 1980s may prove to be superior to 
commercial systems. But as this is being written in 1993, it is not in 
production. 
In 12 years presenting educational programs for NASA all over 
the United States, this writer is asked occasionally why NASA, a 
civilian agency of government, works with the military. There is an 
official reason, and a good reason. NASA is the official U. S. 
Government agency for all aeronautics research, not just civil 
aeronautics research. The good reason for NASA to be in the "loop" in 
military research is the greater possibility of getting the benefits of 
that research into civil aircraft sooner. This writer is convinced that 
much duplicated research is done by the military and NASA because 
of secrecy requirements within the military establishment. 
Also NASA is answerable to Congress and is funded directly by 
Congress. Few scientific studies on what research programs should be 
pursued and funded have come from Congress. Perhaps if NASA had 
the independence or autonomy, it would be possible to form 
partnerships to improve safety. 
NASA management appears to be unable to push good ideas. 
The money spent on research is wasted if the products, systems, 
ideas, or techniques researched are not used. Only by reading trade 
publications would you know whether NASA does anything in 
aeronautics, much less aeronautics safety. 
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Recommendations 
NASA aeronautics safety programs have been responsible for 
research that has made or will make the skies safer for passengers 
and air crews. NASA should continue its aeronautics safety research 
and become a more assertive leader in the field of aeronautics safety. 
Recommendations for NASA's role in future aeronautics safety 
programs follow: 
1. NASA should establish a task force on aeronautics safety 
similar to the NASA Aeronautics Advisory Committee Task 
Force on General Aviation Transportation with government, 
industry, university, and aeronautics organization 
participation. 
2. NASA should be allowed to pursue development by assisting 
industry partners for inventions or technologies that would 
enhance aeronautics safety. This would allow the technology 
to be placed in service sooner. This development could be in 
cooperation with the NASA Technology Utilization Office. 
3. NASA has developed several ice detectors and deice 
systems. Several have been developed by private 
corporations. A lightweight, low cost complete ice 
detector I deice system should be developed as a cooperative 
venture with government, industry, university, and 
aeronautics organization participation. 
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4. NASA should join with government agencies and other 
organizations to press the U.S. Air Force to allow civilian 
usage of the precise code for navigation using the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) for enhanced safety in navigation 
and instrument landings. Then working with private 
industry, government, university, and aeronautics 
organizations, an easy-to-use low-cost navigation and 
instrument landing system should be developed. The system 
should use Differential GPS, DGPS similar or analogous to the 
"Pinpoint" system developed by Magnavox and Cue Network 
Corporation using commercial FM radio stations, or an 
extension of the marine system being implemented by the 
U.S. Coast Guard. 
5. NASA should seek out promising inventions and developing 
safety systems with the goal of promoting safety. Not 
everything good comes from NASA. If there is a "not-
invented-here," attitude, it should be changed. 
6. A study of the dehumanization of automation systems sp.ould 
' 
be undertaken. Automation takes the pilot/air crew out i 
' 
of the recognition/ decision loop. NASA research has been 
directed at fault tolerant systems or "big brother'' type 
systems to oversee pilot/ air crew actions. 
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7. A study should be made to determine if giving the pilot • 
greater participation in the recognition/ decision loop could 
reduce blunders, incidents, and accidents. All pilot training 
teaches pilots to react, not think. This is true for any and all 
situations, whether it is normal operations or emergency 
situations. 
8. A study of the philosophy of accident prevention should be 
made. It has been shown that as the machines are improved, 
the pilots/ air crews are becoming more of a problem in 
causing incidents and accidents. If more automation and 
more information along with less input and control by the 
pilots and crews are causing problems, possibly there is 
another way. It may be that there is no possibility of totally 
eliminating accidents, but accident reduction is definitely 
possible. 
9. A study should be undertaken to identify and compare other 
fields of human endeavor where accidents have had man-
machine interface causes .. Possibly in other areas, solutions 
have been found that could be adaptable to aeronautics.•. 
10. Congress should provide greater support for NASA 
aeronautics safety programs. 
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11. Increased NASA aeronautics safety research would be an 
excellent directional change away from military aerospace 
research funding and would put displaced workers back on 
the job. 
12. NASA should establish a network on aviation safety research 
programs conducted throughout the world. This network 
could have NASA ASRS as the primary repository of this 
information. 
Without doubt NASA has done much in the field of aviation 
safety. Also, without doubt more research is needed. Much remains 
to be accomplished. A natural follow up to this study would be an 
extension concerning actual and planned NASA aviation safety 
research programs for the decade of the 1990s. 
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NASA CENTERS AERONAUTICS SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
LISTED BY CENTER 
AMES LANGLEY 
27 PROGRAMS 43 PROGRAMS 
ASRS DECOUPLED CONIROLS 
SIMULATORS IN TRAINING CDTI-LaRC 
STALL SPEED INDICATOR GENERAL AVIATION STALL/SPIN 
SMACK CODE EL T RELIABILITY 
COORDINATION & COMMUNICATIONS LOAD LIMITING SUBFLOOR 
CDTI-AMES LOCALIZER ENHANCEMENT 
REDUCED-VISIBILITY SIMULATION ROCKET SPIN RECOVERY 
CLEAR-AIR TURBULENCE STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
FIREWORTHY SEAT CUSHIONING EMERGENCY EGRESS SYSTEM 
FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROLS AUTOPILOT COMPLEXITY TRADEOFF 
DEEP-STALL EXPERIMENT "FOllOW ME" BOX DISPLAY 
FIRE-RESISTANT PANELS WAKE VORTEX AllEVIATION 
MAN-VEHICLE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 20-FOOT SPIN TUNNEL 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE EEDS COORDINATED ELEVATOR-THRUST 
OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT PILOTS TURBULENCE MODELS 
LEWIS 
13 PROGRAMS 
ANTIMISTING KEROSENE 
GENERAL AVIATION ICE PROTECTION 
ICING PREDICTION/ ACCRETION SYSTEM 
MICROWAVE ICE ACCRETION METER 
TURBINE DISK CRACK DETECTOR 
ELECTROTHERMAL DEICER 
PNEUMATIC DEICERS HELICOPTERS 
ELECTROMAGNETIC-IMPULSE DEICERS 
AIRFOIL ICING PERFORMANCE 
ICING PERFORMANCE & HANDLING 
IRT DATA VALIDATION 
ICING TEST ROTORCRAFT 
GROUND DEICING FLUIDS 
FATIGUE, CIRCADIAN RHYTHM LIGHT TWIN WITH ENGINE INOPERATIVE 
SHORT HAUL HUMAN FACTORS LIGHT TWIN, ENGINE OUT AUTOTRIM 
AUTOMATION HUMAN FACTORS DISCONTINUOUS LEADING EDGE 
TCAS B-707 FUSELAGE DROP TEST 
MICROBURSTS GA DATA USE IN ACCIDENT STUDIES 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SYSTEM EFFECT OF DIGITAL AL TIMETRY 
INFORMATION TRANSFER ERROR HEAVY RAIN WIND TUNNEL 
ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS UL 1RASONIC ICE DETECTOR 
COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT WIND GUST MODELING 
- --ATIENTION &_COGNITION _ SPIN RESISTANCE CRITERIA 
HUMAN FACTORS -ADV. AIRCRAFT MICROBURST PROBABILITIES 
CONFLICT/RESOLUTION ADVISORY CID STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS ~ 
"" w 
AMES 
NASA CENTERS AERONAUTICS SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS LISTED 
LANGLEY 
TOPMS 
PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAYS (PFD'S) 
WINDSHEAR MODEL DFW DATA 
COMPOSITE HELICOPTER CRASH TESTS 
GENERAL AVIATION ADVANCED CONTROLS 
LIGHTNING F-106 B MODEL 
ICING EFFECTS ON STABILITY & CONTROL 
WINDSHEAR MODELING 
WINDSHEAR TRAJECTORY GUIDANCE 
DATA LINK, ATC-PILOT-ATC 
DIAGNOSTIC EXPERT SYSTEM 
ULTRASONIC NDE ALUMINUM 
ALDF-RSS HEAVY RAIN SIMULATION 
GA HIGHWAY-IN-THE-SKY, EZ FLY 
FORWARD LOOK WINDSHEAR DETECTION 
BOREDOM DETECTION 
LEWIS 
~ 
O"I 
~ 
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· NASA CENTERS AERONAUTICS SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
CLASSIFIED BY CATEGORY 
LANGLEY LEWIS AMES 
ENVIRONMENT 
CLEAR-AIR TURBULENCE 
MICRO BURSTS 
ENVIRONMENT MACHINE 
MACHINE 
CDTI-AMES 
DEEP-STALL EXPERIMENT 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE EEDS 
FIRE-RESISTANT PANELS 
FIREWORTHY SEAT CUSHIONING 
STALL SPEED INDICATOR 
TCAS 
PEOPLE 
ALDF-RSS HEAVY RAIN SIMULATION ANTIMISTING KEROSENE 
FORWARD LOOK WINDSHEAR DETECTION AIRFOIL ICING PERFORMANCE 
HEAVY RAIN WIND TUNNEL ELECTROMAGNETIC-IMPULSE DEICERS 
LIGHTNING F-106 B MODEL ELECTROTHERMAL DEICER 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING GENERAL AVIATION ICE PROTECTION 
MICROBURST PROBABILITIES ICING DETECTOR/ ACCRETION SYSTEM 
TURBULENCE MODELS ICING PERFORMANCE & HANDLING 
WAKE VORTEX ALLEVIATION ICING TEST ROTORCRAFT 
WIND GUST MODELING IRT DATA VALIDATION 
WINDSHEAR MODEL DFW DATA MICROWAVE ICE ACCRETION METER 
WINDSHEAR MODELING PNEUMATIC DEICERS HELICOPTERS 
WINDSHEAR TRAJECTORY GUIDANCE GROUND DEICING FLUIDS 
TURBINE DISK CRACK DETECTOR 
ASRS MACHINE 
ATIENTION & COGNITION B-707 FUSELAGE DROP TEST 
AUTOMATION HUMAN FACTORS CDTI-LaRC 
. COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CID STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
COORDINATION & COMMUNICATIONS COMPOSITE LIGHTNING RODS 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SYSTEM COORDINATED ELEVATOR-THRUST 
ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS GA DATA USE IN ACCIDENT STIJDIES 
FATIGUE, CIRCADIAN RHYTHM DECOUPLED CONTROLS 
FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROLS DISCONTINUOUS LEADING EDGE 
INFORMATION TRANSFER ERROR ELT RELIABILITY 
MAN-VEHICLE SYSTEMS RESEARCH EMERGENCY EGRESS SYSTEM 
OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF PILOTS · "FOLLOW ME" BOX DISPLAY 
REDUCED-VISIBILITY SIMULATION GENERAL AVIATION ADVANCED CONTROLS 
SHORT HAUL HUMAN FACTORS GENERAL AVIATION STALL/SPIN 
i--' 
er, 
er, 
AMES 
PEOPLE 
SIMULA TORS IN TRAINING 
SMACK CODE 
HUMAN FACTORS ADV. AIRCRAFT 
CONFLICT/RESOLUTION ADVISORY 
· LANGLEY 
MACHINE 
HELICOPTER CRASH TESTS 
HIGHWAY-IN-THE-SKY, EZ FLY 
ICING EFFECTS STABIL11Y & CONTROL 
LIGHT TWIN, ENGINE INOPERATIVE 
LIGHT TWIN, ENGINE OUT AUTOTRIM 
LOAD LIMITING SUBFLOOR 
LOCALIZER ENHANCEMENT 
PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAYS 
ROCKET SPIN RECOVERY 
SPIN RESISTANCE CRITERIA 
20-FOOT SPIN 1UNNEL 
ULTRASONIC ICE DETECTOR 
ULTRASONIC NDE ALUMINUM 
TOPMS 
PEOPLE 
AUTOPILOT COMPLEXI1Y TRADEOFF 
BOREDOM DETECIION 
DATA LINK ATC-PILOT-ATC 
DIAGNOSTIC EXPERT SYSTEM 
EFFECT OF DIGITAL ALTIMETRY 
LEWIS 
1--' 
C"I 
....... 
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AMES 
1980 
ASRS 
SIMULATORS IN TRAINING 
STALL SPEED INDICATOR 
l9fil 
ASRS 
SMACK CODE 
FLIGHT CREW COORDINATION 
CDTI-AMES 
198.2 
ASRS 
CDTI-AMES 
CREW COMMUNICATION 
REDUCED-VISIBILITY SIMULATION 
CLEAR-AIR TURBULENCE 
FIREWORTHY SEATS -
NASA CENTERS AVIATION SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
COMPARED BY YEAR 
LANGLEY 
19.80 
DECOUPLED CONTROLS 
CDTI-LaRC 
GA ST ALL/SPIN 
EL T RELIABILITY 
LOAD LIMITING SUBFLOOR 
LOCALIZER ENHANCEMENT 
ROCKET SPIN RECOVERY 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
l9fil 
DECOUPLED CONTROLS 
EMERGENCY EGRESS SYSTEM 
AUTOPILOT COMPLEXITY TRADEOFF 
"FOLLOW ME" BOX DISPLAY 
WAKE VORTEX ALLEVIATION 
20-FOOTSPIN TUNNEL 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
1982 
COORDINATED ELEVATOR-THRUST 
TURBULENCE MODELS 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
GENERAL AVIATION STALL/SPIN TESTS 
LEWIS 
1980 
ANTIMISTING KEROSENE 
GA ICE PROTECTION 
1981 
ICING DETECTOR/ ACCRETION 
.1982 
MICROWAVE ICE ACCRETION METER 
~ 
Q"I 
<-!) 
NASA CENTERS AERONAUTICS SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS by YEAR 
1.983 
ASRS 
AMES 
CLEAR-AIR 1URBULENCE VORTICES 
FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROLS 
DEEP-STALL EXPERIMENT 
FIRE-RESISTANT PANELS 
1984 
ASRS 
FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROLS 
MVSRF 
SEVERE TURBULENCE 
1985 
ASRS 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE EEDS 
OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT PILOTS 
FATIGUE, CIRCADIAN RHYTHM 
SHORT HAUL HUMAN FACTORS 
AUTOMATION 
198.6 
ASRS 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE EEDS 
FIREWORTHY SEAT CUSHIONING 
TCAS 
ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
MICRO BURST 
CLEAR-AIR TURBULENCE 
LANGLEY 
1.983 
LIGHT 1WIN, ENGINE INOPERATIVE. 
DISCONTINUOUS LEADING EDGE 
B-707 FUSELAGE DROP TEST 
CRASH TEST IMPULSE-MOMENTUM 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
1984 
LIGHT 1WIN ENGINE-OUT TRIM 
DIGITAL ALTIMETRY 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
.1985 
HEAVY RAIN WIND TUNNEL 
ULTRASONIC ICE DETECTOR 
WIND GUST MODELING 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
1986 
SPIN RESISTANCE CRITERIA 
MICROBURST PROBABILITIES 
CID STRUC1URAL ANALYSIS 
COMPOSITE LIGHTNING RODS 
TOPMS 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
LEWIS 
1.983 
1URBINE DISK CRACK DETECTOR 
ELECTROTHERMAL DEICERS 
1984 
PNEUMATIC DEICERS HELICOPTERS 
ELECTROMAGNETIC-IMPULSE DEICERS 
.1985 
AIRFOIL ICING PERFORMANCE 
1986 
ICING PERFORMANCE & HANDLING 
...... 
........ 
0 
NASA CENTERS AERONAUTICS SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS by YEAR 
AMES 
198Z 
ASRS 
FATIGUE, CIRCADIAN RHYTHM 
EMS NE1WORK 
INFORMATION TRANSFER ERROR 
ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
1988 
ASRS 
CRM TRAINING 
FATIGUE, CIRCADIAN RHYTHM 
EMS HUMAN FACTORS 
ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
ATTENTION & COGNITION 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE EEDS 
FIREWORTHY SEAT CUSHIONING 
MICROBURST MODELING 
FIRE RESISTANT PANELS 
CONFLICT /RESOLUTION ADVISORY 
EEDS F/ A-18 FLIGHT TESTS 
198.9 
ASRS 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE EEDS 
EEDS SEA TRIALS 
FIREWORTHYSEAI CUSHIONING . 
EMS HUMAN FACTORS 
TCAS 
LANGLEY 
198Z 
SPIN RESISTANCE CRITERIA 
STORM HAZARDS-LIGHTNING 
TOPMS 
PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAYS (PFD's) 
WINDSHEAR MODEL DFW DATA 
HELICOPTER CRASH TESTS 
1988 
GA ADVANCED CONTROLS 
LIGHTNING F-106 MODEL 
ICING EFFECTS ST ABILI1Y & CONTROL 
WINDSHEAR MODELING 
WINDSHEAR TRAJECTORY GUIDANCE 
TOPMS 
DATA LINK ATC-PILOT-ATC 
DIAGNOSTIC EXPERT SYSTEM 
ULTRASONIC NDE ALUMINUM 
ALDF-RSS HEAVY RAIN SIMULATION 
198.9 
GA HIGHWAY-IN-THE-SKY, EZ FLY 
FORWARD WINDSHEAR DETECT. 
TOPMS 
BOREDOM DETECTION 
ALDF-RSS HEAVY RAIN SIMULATION 
LEWIS 
198Z 
ICING RESEARCH TUNNEL IRT 
1988 
IRT DATA VALIDATION 
198.9 
ICING TEST ROTORCRAFT 
GROUND DEICING FLUIDS 
...... 
" ...... 
AMES 
l.<IB9 
FATIGUE, CIRCADIAN RHYTHM 
ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
NASA CENTERS AERONAUTICS SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS by YEAR 
LANGLEY 
ADV. TECH. AC. HUMAN FACTORS 
HUMAN FACTORS ADVANCED AIRCRAFT 
LEWIS 
~ 
....... 
N 
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NASA CENTERS AVIATION SAFETY 
RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
BY APPLICABILITY 
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CENTER DATE(s) PROGRAM 
PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO ALL AVIATION 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
AMES 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
80-89 
80 
81 
82 
82-89 
84 
85-89 
85 
87 
88 
88 
80 
80 
80-88 
81 
81 
83 
84 
85 
88 
88 
81 
81,82 
84 
85 
86 
88 
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
STALL SPEED INDICATOR 
SMOOTHING FOR AIRCRAFT KINEMATICS (SMACK) 
REDUCED-VISIBILITY SIMULATION 
FIREWORTHY SEAT CUSHIONING 
MAN-VEHICLE SYSTEMS RESEARCH FACILITY 
ELECTRO-EXPULSIVE DEICE SYSTEM (EEDS) 
OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF PILOT PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION TRANSFER-NATIONAL AEROSPACE SYSTEM 
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF ATI'ENTION AND COGNITION 
ADVISORY SYSTEM CONFLICT DETECTION RESOLUTION 
COCKPIT DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION (CDTI) 
LOCALIZER DISPLAY ENHANCEMENT 
· STORM HAZARDS (LIGHTNING) 
AUTOPILOT COMPLEXITY /BENEFIT STIJDY 
WAKE VORTEX ALLEVIATION 
GA CRASH DATA ROLE - IMPULSE & MOMENTIJM 
EFFECT OF DIGITAL ALTIMETRY ON PILOT WORKLOAD 
DEVELOPMENT OF ULTRASONIC ICE DETECTION SYSTEM 
LIGHTNING AITACHMENT TESTS ON F-106B SCALE MODEL 
QUANTIFYING ICING EFFECTS ON STABILITY & CONTROL 
AIRCRAFT ICING DETECTOR AND ACCRETION METER 
MICROWAVE ICE ACCRETION METER (MIAM) 
ELECTROMAGNETIC-IMPULSE DEICING SYSTEM (EIDI) 
AIRFOIL PERFORMANCE IN ICING CONDITIONS 
AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE & HANDLING CHANGES IN: ICING 
ICING RESEARCH TIJNNEL IRT VALIDITY TESTS 
PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO AIR TRANSPORT 
AMES 80 
AMES 81-88 
AMES 81-82 
AMES 82-86 
AMES 83-88 
AMES 83-88 
AMES 85-89 
AMES 85 
USE OF SIMULATORS IN PILOT TRAINING 
FIJGHT CREW COORDINATION & COMMUNICATION 
LATER COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM) 
COCKPIT TRAFFIC DISPLAYS (CDTI-AMES) 
ANALYSIS OF CLEAR-AIR TURBULENCE 
ERROR/FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL -
MANAGEMENT /SYSTEMS 
FIRE-RESISTANT AIRCRAFT INTERIOR PANELS 
INDMDUAL CREW FACTORS IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
FATIGUE AND JET-LAG STIJDY: LONG HAUL & SHORT HAUL 
AIRCRAFT AUTOMATION: FIELD STIJDIES & GUIDELINES 
175 
PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO AIR TRANSPORT 
AMES 86-89 TRAFFIC ALERT COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS) 
AMES 85 - 88 MICROBURST INVESTIGATIONS 
AMES 88 ADVISORY SYSTEM FOR CONFLICT DETECTION AND 
RESOLUTION FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
AMES 89 HUMAN FACTORS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSPORTS 
LaRC 80,81 DECOUPLED CONTROLS - IMPROVED SAFE1Y IN WIND SHEAR 
LaRC 82 COORDINATED ELEVATOR & THRUST CONTROL 
LaRC 82 - 85 WIND TURBULENCE MODELS FOR PILOTED AIRCRAFT 
LaRC 83 VERTICAL DROP TEST OF B-707 FUSELAGE SECTION 
LaRC 85 AIRFOIL PERFORMANCE IN SIMULA TED HEAVY RAIN 
LaRC 86 MICROBURST SEVERI1Y WEILBULL PROBABILI1Y 
LaRC 86 CONTROLLED IMPACT DEMONSTRATION (CID) ANALYSIS 
LaRC 86 COMPOSITE LIGHTNING RODS FOR AIRCRAFT 
LaRC 86- 89 TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM (TO PMS) 
LaRC 87 EFFECTS HORIZONTAL & VERTICAL INFORMATION INTO 
PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY (PFD) 
LaRC 87 VALIDATED WINDSHEAR MODEL, DFW MICROBURST DATA 
LaRC 88 WINDSHEAR INFLUENCE VORTEX-LATTICE METHOD 
LaRC 88 AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORY GUIDANCE WINDSHEAR 
ENCOUNTERS 
LaRC 88 DIAGNOSTIC EXPERT SYSTEM USING NTSB ACCIDENT DATA 
LaRC 88 ULTRASONIC NON DESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUE, AL FATIGUE 
LaRC 88 ALDF- RSS HEAVY RAIN SIMULATION 
LaRC 88 ULTRASONIC TECHNIQUE TO DETERMINE FATIGUE STATE 
SIGNIFICANT ALUMINUM ALLOY 
LaRC 89 FORWARD-LOOK WINDSHEAR DETECTION FOR AIRCRAFT 
LaRC 89 PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES USEFUL IN BOREDOM 
DE'IECilON 
LeRC 80 ANTIMISTING KEROSENE 
LeRC 83 TURBINE DISK CRACK DETECTOR 
LeRC 83 HEAT CONDUCTION ANALYSIS ELECTROTHERMAL DEICERS 
LeRC 89 GROUND DEICING FLUIDS -LOWER AERODYNAMIC 
PENALTIES 
PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO GENERAL AVIATION 
AMES 83 CONTROLLED DEEP STALL EXPERIMENT 
AMES 87-89 EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE SAFE1Y PROBLEMS 
LaRC 80 EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER (ELT) RELIABILI1Y 
LaRC 80 GENERAL AVIATION STALUSPIN RESEARCH 
LaRC 80 EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER (ELT) RELIABILI1Y 
LaRC 80 LOAD LIMITING SUBFLOOR STRUCTURE 
LaRC 80 SPIN RESEARCH WITH A ROCKET RECOVERY SYSTEM 
LaRC 81 EMERGENCY EGRESS SYSTEM FOR AIRCRAFT 
LaRC 81 "FOLLOW ME" BOX DISPLAY FOR GENERAL AVIATION 
LaRC 81 20 FOOT VERTICAL WIND TUNNEL 
LaRC 83 ENGINE-OUT CHARACTERISTICS OF LIGHT TWIN AIRCRAFT 
: 176 
PROGRAMS APPLICABLE TO GENERAL AVIATION 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LaRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
LeRC 
83 
84 
86,87 
87 
88 
88 
89 
80 
84 
89 
GA STAll/SPIN DISCONTINUOUS LEADING EDGE 1 
AUTOMATIC ENGINE-OUTTRIM FOR LIGHT 1WIN AIR<i:RAFT 
SPIN RESISTANCE CRITERIA FOR LIGHT GA AIRCRAFT 
CRASH TESTS COMPOSITE HELICOPTERS 
ADVANCED CONTROLS FOR GA AIRPLANES 
REDUCTION PILOT STRESS BY DATA LINK ATC-PILOT-ATC 
HIGHWAY-IN THE-SKY (HITS) AND EZ FLY CONCEPTS 
IMPROVED ICE PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR GA AIRCRAFT 
PNEUMATIC DEICERS FOR HELICOPTER ROTORS 
NEW ICING TEST CAPABILI1Y FOR ROTORCRAFT 
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